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AIR ANTITANK SEMINAR 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
16, 17 March 1977 
Introduction 
Aircraft and tanks have existed together on battlefields since 
the first tanks went into combat on the Western Front in September 
1916. The British vehicles, which attacked at Pezieres in the Somme 
region in mid-September, were soon joined by French and later American 
tanks. By the end of the war in 1918, the Allies had constructed large 
numbers 3,000, for example, in France alone. Despite the numbers of 
tanks and even greater numbers of combat aircraft employed during the 
First World War, no evidence exists of purposeful attacks by significant 
numbers of aircraft against armored vehicles. The German Army's flying 
corps, faced with more pressing problems of gaining air superiority 
against a larger Allied air force, was unable to intervene decisively 
on the ground. The various flying corps of the Allies, although having 
greater opportunity for ground attack especially after the German 
defeats of August 1918, and the impending collapse of the German Army, 
had virtually no targets to attack. Due to a basically different 
outlook on the methods by which to break the trench stalemate in the West, 
the Germans were late in developing tanks and employed only 45 in combat 
(in 12 engagements) during the First World War, compared with numerous 
attacks by hundreds of Allied tanks. 
In the interwar period (1919-1939), the major powers of the world 
developed and fielded imposing tank and air forces. The government of 
the Soviet Union, in particular, supported an imposing armaments program 
which gave the Soviets the largest tank, air, and submarine forces in 
the world in 1939. When the Germans implemented Operation Barbarossa 
against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the Soviet tank force comprised 
approximately 22,000 tanks of varying size and quality, and the air force 
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roughly 14,000 military aircraft. Between June-November 1941, the 
German armed forces on the Eastern Front destroyed or captured 
approximately 17,000 Soviet tanks, with almost all of the damage 
being credited to German groun? weapons especially tank cannon and 
antitank guns. On other fronts in the Second World War in Europe, 
including Poland, the West, Scandinavia, and North Africa from 1939-1941, 
little evidence exists of effective direct attack by aircraft against 
tanks. 
In late June 1942, the Germans opened their massive summer 
offensive, designated Operation Blue, in the Central Ukraine. The 
first direct attack by aircraft against tanks in significant numbers 
took place late in the operation as the German Sixth Army directed its 
supporting aircraft to prevent the buildup of a Soviet defensive front 
west of Stalingrad anchored on the Kalach River and the hills south of 
the Don River. German JU-87 aircraft largely in the D model, and massed 
in large numbers in the temporarily expanded, mission-tailored Immelmann 
Wing, rapidly developed tactics, technique and doctrine for direct attack 
against Soviet main battle tanks. The commander of the Immelmann Wing, 
Major Paul-Werner Hozzel, estimated that approximately 200 Soviet tanks 
were destroyed or severely damaged by Stuka attacks with high explosive 
bombs and special fuzes and penetrating caps. 
Encouraged by the successes of late 1942, and the necessities and 
opportunities of the Eastern Front, the Germans aggressively developed 
a new aircraft, the Henschel 129, for direct attack against tanks. The 
Germans also experimented with new weapons and modifications for the 
JU-87 (Stuka) aircraft. The twin-engined Henschel 129, armed in its most 
successful version with a single, external 30mm cannon, scored a major 
success in direct attack against Soviet tanks during the Kursk battles of 
July 1943. At the end of the year, JU-87G1 aircraft, armed with two 
specially modified 37mm guns with pod mountings, went into action against 
Soviet forces which were attacking the German 17th Army in the Kuban 
(Caucasus) bridgehead. Faced with the necessity to defeat numerous 
mobile, armored targets and the opportunity to employ relatively low 
performance aircraft against them, the Luftwaffe by 1944 had fielded 
a moderate quantity of anti-tank aircraft which achieved during that year 
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the most significant air antitank successes of the Second World War. 
The Western Allies during the African, Sicilian, Italian, and 
Western campaigns of 1942-1945, conducted massive tactical air attacks 
against German ground forces and severely restricted the mobility of 
the German armies in the Mediterranean and Western theaters of operations. 
Except for the middle of 1942 in North Africa, the Germans stood largely 
on the defensive in the Southern and Western campaigns and employed 
only moderate numbers of tanks. The Germans rapidly adapted themselves 
to defensive tactics which emphasized night movement, camouflage, 
dispersion and other means to reduce the vulnerability of their tanks 
to the attacks of the aggressive Allied Jabos, or fighter-bombers. 
Being on the defensive strategically, the Germans were able to refuse 
their tanks as targets of Allied air attack more effectively than the 
Soviets who were forced to move, attack, and expose themselves to the 
German Henschels and Junkers. 
Presently available historical evidence supports a view that 
Allied air attack against German vehicles in columns and lagers in 
the West produced damage mainly to the unarmored trucks and lightly 
armored personnel carriers. The German tanks according to German 
reports and Allied studies came through the air attacks largely unscathed. 
In several actions in which the Allies launched attacks specifically 
against tanks in Normandy and later operations in Northern France, the 
Lowlands, and Germany, best evidence indicates that the German tanks 
were largely damaged by Allied tanks and other weapons including antitank 
guns, recoilless weapons, mines, etc. In sharp contrast, German 
aircraft in the East, with large numbers of Soviet tanks available as 
targets and relatively more effective antitank weapons, inflicted 
major damage on the Soviet armored force in 1944. The famed Stuka 
pilot, Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel, alone was credited by the Germans 
with 519 catastrophic kills of Soviet tanks, i.e., evidence by two 
or more witnesses of internal explosions and fire in the tanks hit by 
the tungsten carbide penetrators of his high velocity 37rrun guns (3,700 
feet per second at muzzle.) 
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Research into combat involving significant numbers of tanks 
and aircraft since the Second World War has been conducted for the 
Korean War and the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973, and less 
effectively for the Inda-Pakistani Wars. Available evidence supports 
the general view that aircraft damaged few tanks in those wars. The 
generalization is an important one for the understanding of the modern 
air-land war, but little additional study has been forthcoming to 
discover the reasons why aircraft had the relatively scant success in 
direct attack against tanks in those wars. Tentative explanations for 
the dearth of aircraft results against tanks include the following: 
(1) Ground weapons are presently relatively more effective 
than air weapons against tanks. 
(2) Ground tactical situations allow easier acquisition, impact, 
and kill of targets. 
(3) Air superiority missions of air forces predominate over 
ground attack missions against enemy ground forces, especially at the 
beginning of wars. 
(4) Air defense from ground weapons will degrade the effect-
iveness of air-to-ground attack and in extreme cases prevent such attack. 
The information to support the historical survey sketched above 
accumulated at the Naval Postgraduate School during the last decade. 
During the same period of time, based partly on the U.S. perception of 
the tank threat in Central Europe, the U.S. in cooperation with the 
Fairchild and General Electric industrial firms brought the A-10 ground 
attack aircraft to the point of series production. The developers of 
the A-10 aircraft designed the aircraft to include a powerful 30mm 
Gatling gun for effective attack against Soviet main battle tanks. 
The gun, presently designated the GAU-8/A, has proven to be an 
extraordinarily effective piece of gun technology. In combination 
with the highly survivable, twin-engined· jet aircraft wrapped around 
it, the powerful, seven-barreled Gatling gun brought into sharp focus 
the capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft against armored forces. 
The mission profile of the A-10 aircraft includes attack against 
a wide spectrum of ground targets both at the forward edge of the 
battle area and farther back within the enemy zone of communications. 
Although its accurate, lethal cannon system gives it unprecedented 
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capabilities against main battle tanks and other armored vehicles, 
the A-10 must attack targets which range from troops in the open 
to major industrial and communications structures. The GAU-8/A 
automatic cannon, however, with its antitank capabilities, and the 
intended deployment of its carrying platform, the A-10 aircraft, to 
Central Europe, represents the high point of U.S. Air Force interest 
in tactical ground attack in Europe and especially problems of air 
attack against tanks. The great tank wars fought in the Middle East 
in 1967 and 1973, accentuated DoD-wide interest in antitank defense. 
And, finally, the development of the XM-1 tank, various recoilless 
antitank weapons, special tank armor, the appearance of a new Soviet 
main battle tank, and a heavy increase in numbers of Soviet tanks 
in Central Europe, have conspired to make tanks and antitank defense 
one of the most fashionable defense issues of the day (1977). 
The October 1973 War in the Middle East, the Qualitative and 
quantitative increase in Soviet tank capabilities in E. Germany, 
and the impending deployment of A-10 aircraft to Central Europe were 
particularly important in bringing about the Air Antitank Seminar of 
16, 17 March 1977 at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Those events 
stimulated the NPS thesis entitled, "A Comparison of the Projected A-10 
Employment in Europe and the Luftwaffe Schlachtgeschwader Experience 
in World War Two", by Captain Lonnie Q; Ratley, III, USAF, and the 
historical optimism which the thesis provides for the successful 
employment of fixed-wing aircraft against tanks. Studies completed 
by Associate Professor R.H.S. Stolfi in conjunction with others in 
Israel and at the NPS have become known to the U.S. Marine Corps. 
In conjunction with the tank-heavy situation in Europe, the Middle East, 
and the Inda-Pakistani area, the studies have contributed to increased 
Marine Corps interest in the employment of its fixed-wing aircraft 
against tanks and other armored vehicles. The interaction among the 
Air Force and Captain Ratley, the Marine Corps and Professor Stolfi 
was uniquely combined with the experiences of German tank attack pilots 
into a U.S. service - and-industry - wide seminar. 
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THE SEMINAR: GENERAL 
A seminar which addressed itself to the attack by fixed-wing 
aircraft against armored vehicles, was held at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, on 16-17 March 1977. The seminar 
brought together officers, scientists, engineers, managers, and 
others from the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, Army, U.S. 
industry, and, in absentia, several European experts on air attack 
against tanks. The attendees were united by concern over the problems 
of fixed-wing aircraft engaging armored vehicles on the ground, and 
their interests varied from responsibility for major development 
programs thru defensive concern for doctrine and programs in which 
air attack against main battle tanks plays a small role. The purpose 
of the seminar was to bring together a wide range of experts, interested 
persons, and perhaps only mildly interested people, to discuss several 
topics on the subject of air antitank warfare and to establish a 
consensus or lack thereof on each topic. The organizers of the seminar 
arranged the topics systematically so that the answers to a parallel 
set of questions developed for the topics would result "automatically" 
in a tentative doctrine of employment for aircraft against tanks. 
Whether or not a tentative doctrine of employment would emerge would 
depend on the actual answers to the questions. In the event that no 
consensus could be achieved among the attendees, the possibility still 
existed that a relatively clear conflict or set of alternatives on a 
particular topic would develop. 
The seminar included the following eight topics for discussion and 
parallel set of questions for consideration of the attendees: 
I. General Utility of Fixed-Wing Aircraft in Attack 
Versus Tanks 
II. U.S. Fixed-Wing Aircraft Assets 
III. U.S. Air Ordance Assets 
IV. Pilot Selection for Air Antitank Warfare 
V. Tactics A - Specific Locations in Theater of 
Operations for attack on tanks. 
VI. Tactics B - Air Defense Challenge to Antitank Aircraft 
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........... ----------------------------------------------------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~ ~ 
VII. Tactics C - Tank Acquisition and Attack 
VIII. Individual Pilot and Unit Training 
The seminar lasted two days and prior to the time the attendees 
began to comment on the above topics, several hours of historical 
background were presented. The historical framework served to give 
the attendees a picture of the actual results achieved in the past 
with fixed-wing aircraft against tanks. If the historical background 
were carefully drawn, i.e., as complete and accurate an account as a 
reasonable amount of presentation time would allow, the attendees would 
have a credible fund of historical data from which to consider the 
present and make suggestions for technological development and operational 
doctrine in the near future. 
The seminar organizers at the Naval Postgraduate School also invited 
a wide range of persons to attend the meeting in order to get a general 
perspective on the problems of tank hunting from the air. The organizers 
felt that the less concerned attendees would temper and constructively 
challenge the more deeply involved persons. It was felt, alternately, 
that the attendees who were more deeply involved in the challenge of 
tank hunting from the air would transfer a sense of urgency, a superior 
fund of knowledge, and possibly a more realistic view of the importance 
and special demands of antitank defense from the air. 
The attendees were considered to represent a broad range of views 
because of the different organizations from which they came to attend 
the seminar. The Marine Corps aviator who came from Headquarters, Marine 
Corps, for example, expressed rather different views on the seminar 
questions from those presented by the Air Force Aviators currently flying 
A-10 aircraft in operations being conducted at Nellis Air Force Base, 
Nevada. The several representatives of U.S. industry presented views 
which were oriented toward the contribution that their manufactured 
products could make to antitank warfare from the air. The organizers 
of the seminar had interviewed several German combat aviators of the 
Second World War on the subject of their extensive experiences in 
attacking Soviet tanks in Eastern and Central Europe during the last 
part of the Second World War from late 1942-1945. The German aviators 
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were interviewed prior to the seminar and their answers to a parallel 
set of questions on the seminar topics were introduced as if they were 
actually present at the meeting. As might be imagined, the German 
comments proved to be particularly instructive and decisive. Those 
comments also served to remind the attendees that most of the problems 
being addressed, although seemingly unique, had been met by others in 
the recent past whose experiences are valuable guide to future technical 
development and military operations. 
As shown in Figure One, the seminar was carefully structured to 
extract the views of persons associated with a wide range of military, 
industrial, and former military organizations. Rather than opening 
each topic to general discussion, the organizers of the seminar 
suggested a unique approach. Each organization would be given a 
discrete block of time to have one or more of its attendees give his 
views on the topic under "discussion". Given the lack of matured 
doctrine in any of the armed services on the subject of fixed-wing 
aircraft attack against tanks, the attendees would necessarily have 
to give their own answers to the questions shown in Figure Two. The 
assumption has been made that such answers on the part of the officers 
in the Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and Army represent the thoughts 
of individuals in those services who have current interests and 
responsibilities in ground attack aviation. The industrial attendees 
at the seminar, in contrast, were more closely able to represent the 
views of their firm on the appropriate hardware topics and questions. 
The Germans, who included, in absentia, the prestigious Stuka ace 
(more than 2,500 combat sorties), Hans-Ulrich Rudel, were able to 
present German doctrine on actual antitank warfare from the air on 
all of the topics. 
Much self-discipline was required on the part of the attendees 
who answered the questions within the scheduled time. Perhaps even 
more restraint was required by the persons who attended the meeting 
knowing in advance that the discussion would probably be limited to 
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the structured way in which an extraordinarily wide range of persons 
was constrained to present concise views on fixed-wing air attack 
against tanks, spectators and field participants alike probably saw 
more pertinent views being exchanged than is ordinarily the case. 
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THE SEMINAR: TOPIC I 
The first topic was a very broad one which addressed itself 
to the general utility of fixed-wing aircraft in attack against 
tanks. Implied in the topic was the possibility that the general 
utility of fixed-wing aircraft might be determined to be low and the 
seminar ended a day early. Because of various attributes of the 
modern battlefield, especially the formidable capabilities of various 
ground antitank and antiaircraft weapons, the usefulness of fixed-
wing aircraft in attack against tanks cannot be said to be unassailably 
high. To the contrary, effective tactical syntheses can be imagined and 
have existed in which tactical air forces confined themselves to air 
superiority sorties, setpiece ground attack operations in support of 
major pre-planned operations, and interdiction strikes against lines 
of communication. The expense and complexity of modern combat aircraft 
also tend to raise doubts about their effective use in ground attack. 
Can five-million-dollar U.S. combat aircraft effectively engage large 
numbers, e.g., tens of thousands, of relatively inexpensive Soviet 
armored vehicles? 
The attendees were asked to consider the attributes of the 
fixed-wing air assets available in the U.S. armed forces and assess 
the value or utility of using such assets in the antitank role. To 
focus attention on the topic and to elicit pertinent and concise 
response, the chairman asked the spokesman of each logical groupment 
of attendees to answer the following question: What are the advantageous 
characteristics of fixed-wing aircraft compared with other weapons · 
platforms which make those aircraft effective in the antitank role? 
Figure One shows the organization of the seminar in terms of the way 
in which the responses to the topic questions were sequenced. As 
shown in the figure, answers were presented in order by individuals 
associated with the Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, Army and U.S. 
Industry. Last in sequence were the responses of antitank-combat 
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experienced German aviators of the Second World War. The responding 
attendees were tightly limited in the time for their answers and 
discussion took place in the unique sense that approximately eleven 
persons (usually two Air Force officers, one Marine Corps officer, 
one Naval officer, two Army officers, two industrial representatives, 
and two German experts) with different backgrounds expressed their 
views without interruption on the topic and similarly were presented 
with the views of the others. Under the rules of engagement of the 
seminar, an impressive amount of opinion was exchanged in an organized 
fashion in a short period of time. Discussion of whether or not a 
consensus existed among the various comments, took place in the last 
13 minutes of each topic session. 
Air Force officersl at the seminar expressed the view that fixed-
wing aircraft could be massed with unique speed and flexibility to 
various areas of the air-land battle. They elaborated in their remarks 
that attack aircraft had the capabilities to loiter relatively close 
to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and attack with ordnance 
of unique variability ranging from antitank cannon thru guided bombs, 
missiles, clusters, fuel air explosives (FAE), and mines. The Air 
Force officers offered the view that specialized close air support 
(CAS) aircraft like the Fairchild A-10, could be integrated within 
the scheme of maneuver of the ground commander. Those officers also 
felt that given the vagaries and constraints of weather in Central 
Europe and the large number of potential armored targets that light 
automatic cannon (approximately 25-35mm) offered a combination of 
lethality, rate of fire, reliability, and accuracy superior to other 
weapons. No existing attack-type helicopters can carry a cannon as 
big as the Gatling gun built into the present Air Force A-10 aircraft. 
The number of sorties which can be flown by fixed-wing aircraft 
operating from lightly prepared advanced strips may surge to as high 
as 17 in a single day. The number 17 was achieved recently in actual 
operations conducted under simulated wartime conditions but favorable 
1 Col R. Dilger, Col J. Romack, LtCol J. Dempsey 
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weather in southwest Nevada. 
The high strategic mobility of fixed-wing aircraft was also 
cited by the Air Force officers as an important asset in large 
areas of operation. Attack aircraft they feel represent an 
antitank asset superior in mobility and survivability to any other 
type of aircraft and superior in mobility and delivery of varied 
ordnance to any similarly scaled ground weapons platform, e.g., 
tank, self-p~opelled howitzer, etc .. Not only can attack aircraft 
ferry themselves for thousands of miles but they can shift within 
theaters of operation for hundreds of miles at speeds far in excess 
of helicopters or ground weapons. The Air Force officers felt that 
fixed-wing aircraft could accomplish the moves with relative invul-
nerability even in the face of strong enemy air attack. They couched 
their statements in careful terms which noted that commitment of 
fixed-wing air assets would necessarily be in response to requests 
by the Army and under circumstances in which the ground forces 
were hard-pressed to resist the armor threat. 
As noted in Figure One, which represents organization of 
discussion in the seminar topics, the Marine Corps officer at the 
seminar commented next on the same topic question. The Marine Corps 
major 1 emphasized the shibboleths of Marine Corps doctrine which 
emphasize flexibility and the ability·to mass firepower rapidly on 
the battlefield in support of friendly rifles and armor. The major 
emphasized that the unique air wings of the Marine Corps were 
dedicated largely to close air support (CAS). Dedicated as such to 
the CAS role, Marine aviation stands as a monument to the general 
usefulness of fixed-wing aircraft in ground attack. The seminar 
topic and question, however, addresses itself to the antitank part 
of ground attack, and the major in addressing the antitank role for 
fixed-wing aircraft emphasized that the Marine Corps could not afford 
dedicated weapons, e.g., in this case a fixed-wing aircraft dedicated 
1see Appendix l, for names of the primary attendees and their phone 
numbers and organizations for coordination and information. 
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to antitank attack. 
Very early in the first topic question of the seminar a schism 
developed among the attendees on the concrete question of the 
necessities of air attack in a dense armor environment. The Air 
Force officers took the view based largely on experiences and thinking 
which brought the A-10 aircraft into existence that air attack 
against ground forces which were heavy in armor requires a special 
aircraft. The Marine officer took the view that aircraft like the 
A-10 were dedicated to a narrow band of the CAS spectrum and 
inefficient for Marine Corps use. The Air Force intends to employ 
the A-10 aircraft for other CAS missions besides antitank, thus 
negating a substantial part of the Marine officer's objectives to 
it, and it became apparent that two other objections existed namely 
(1) rejection of the attachment of special importance to the armor 
threat, and (2) embracing of the philosophy that attack aircraft in 
general must operate fast and high. 
The naval officers present espoused the view that fixed-wing 
aircraft are flexible and highly mobile weapons platforms which can 
conduct attacks over large areas and react quickly to changing tactical 
situations. Those officers took the general tack that there are many 
uses for naval aircraft, all of which have to be examined, and none 
of which should be overemphasized to the detriment of conducting 
the broadest range of missions "across the board". The sophisticated 
A6E naval all-weather attack and electronics warfare aircraft was 
pointed out as an example of the complete aircraft, i.e., one able 
to function day and night in difficult weather and against practically 
any target with significant chance of inflicting damage. The question: 
fast or slow? was answered by the Naval officers with the words, fast 
and multi-purpose. 
The Army officers at the seminar noted the mobility and flexibility 
of fixed-wing aircraft as special advantages of those aircraft unmatched 
by helicopters and ground weapons. The Army major who was asked to 
comment on the topic question from an ordnance and ballistic viewpoint 
made the imaginative point that especially fixed-wing aircraft give 
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the friendly forces position (1) over, and (2) at the rear, of Soviet 
main battle tanks with all of the accruing advantages. The same officer 
also noted that fixed-wing aircraft in the attack role, as opposed 
to the transport role, provide superior payload and have superior 
recoil absorption characteristics to present attack helicopters. 
· The Army colonel in attendance at the seminar emphasized that 
fixed-wing aircraft possesses advantages in surge capability, compared 
with helicopters. All of the advantages are not with the fixed-wing 
aircraft, however, and the colonel noted that helicopters in his view 
had superior foul weather capabilities relative to combat operations 
near the FEBA. He also felt that helicopters possessed some advantages 
in acquiring ground targets, a view which implies the existence of 
a relatively passive air defense situation, for example, as in 
counterinsurgency operations. The colonel made an interesting point 
relative to the presence of an overly rich tank environment, noting 
that a restricted amount of air space over a concentration of tactically 
deployed armor would restrict the effectiveness of fixed-wing jet 
aircraft. The relatively high performance of those aircraft would in 
fact result in some challenging queing problems especially in a 
technically advanced air defense environment. 
Representatives of U.S. industry next considered the question 
of the general usefulness of fixed-wing aircraft in the antitank role. 
As might be expected, at least some of the cormnents reflected the 
interests of the industrial companies in the development and production 
of Department of Defense funded materiel. Mr. E. T. Suydam, who 
represented the General Electric Company, Burlington, Vermont, made 
the point that, given the state of the art (technologically) in aircraft 
production, only fixed-wing type aircraft were capable of carrying, 
firing, and maneuvering effectively with a cannon as powerful as the 
seven-barreled, Gatling produced by his company. Displaying flexibility 
and tact, Mr. T. E. Gaines of the Vought Corporation, Dallas, Texas, 
whose business firm produces the versatile A-7 attack aircraft, noted 
that the air-land battle must be carefully orchestrated among a variety 
of combat air assets and to include missions ranging from air defense 
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and air superiority through CAS and interdiction of potential enemy 
air, ground, and sea routes of communication. The implication in 
the statement of the Vought Corporation executive is that a balanced 
force of several types of aircraft is necessary especially to reach 
into the region beyond the FEBA. Mr. R. W. Warden of the Aerojet 
Ordnance and Manufacturing Company, Downey, California, made the 
significant comment that his firm had emphasized advanced technology 
in the design and production the GAU-8/A 30mm ammunition in response 
to the refreshing philosophy of his company in providing what he 
termed, "an affordable round of ammunition". The Aerojet representative 
quickly dispelled the impression that his firm might be developing into 
a unique philanthropic organization by making the cogent point that 
the Soviet military mass psychology, e.g., perhaps 200,000 armoured 
vehicles capable of operating on the modern battlefield, must be 
countered by immense quantities of effective projectiles. 
The statements of the European experts on air antitank warfare 
were introduced at this juncture in the development of seminar Topic I. 
Prior to the beginning of the seminar, the organizers had completed 
interviews with several German attack aviators of the Second World War. 
Two of the German pilots, Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel and Brigadier General 
Paul-Werner Hozzel, possessed heavy experience in tank hunting on the 
Eastern Front during the period late 1942-1945. Colonel Rudel ranks, 
in what must be noted as an impressive firmament of potential selectees, 
as probably the outstanding combat aviator in the history of aerial 
warfare. General Hozzel, former commanding officer of the Immelmann 
Wing and leader of the first purposeful and effective strikes by aircraft 
against armor (Eastern Ukraine, September 1942), is an agile thinker 
and well-adjusted personality who was able to articulate his experiences 
in the East particularly well. 
The former German antitank pilots were asked to comment on the 
following special version of the question which accompanies Topic I: 
what special advantages of fixed-wing aircraft gave you the success 
which you achieved with the antitank aircraft of 1943-1945? Colonel 
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Rudel was interviewed and began his series of answers with the brutal 
logic that "when the tanks were there in great numbers they had to 
be attacked ... ", and all weapons were pressed into service by the 
Germans including combat aircraft down to the last one capable of 
fl,ight. Rudel went on to comment that "the advantage of the aircraft 
is that it can go anywhere on the battlefield and attack from any 
direction." He noted the fact that the initial ordinary ammunition 
for the aircraft cannon would not destroy the tanks but the later 
" ••. Wolfram projectiles gave the Luftwaffe the actual capability of 
getting through the opposing armor." What is the correlation 
between the colonel's specific point about weapons and the question 
of the general utility of fixed wing aircraft in the antitank role? 
The point would seem to be that aircraft have utility only if armed 
with weapons which have the accuracy and lethality to destroy tanks. 
In discussions on later topics, Rudel repeatedly made the observation 
in emphasizing the reality of the great tank war on the Eastern Front 
that his aircraft served largely to carry the 37mm cannon to within 
range of the Soviet tanks. 
Rudel was interviewed on Topic I during the evening in relaxed 
surroundings, but both he and the interviewers were tired, the former 
especially so from a major leg operation. Additional information 
probably could have been extracted under different circumstances. In 
contrast, General Hozzel was interviewed early in the afternoon in 
his own home and with all persons fresh and alert. Hozzel's first 
comment on the general question was that fixed-wing aircraft widened 
the operational area against tanks to include their early discovery 
and destruction in assembly areas. To illustrate his point about 
expanding the operational area, Hozzel described the versatile 
employment of the Immelmann Wing under his command to disintegrate 
the Soviet defensive front which was building up in the autumn of 
1942 near Kalach (Kalatsch) at the great bend of the Don River. Under 
Hozzel, the Immelmann Wing was rapidly task organized to strike 
approximately 100 kilometers in front of the German Sixth Army. 
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Using special bombs with fortification breaking heads and delay fuses 
developed for the French campaign, the wing commander launched 
approximately 200 Stukas far in advance of the Sixth Army in direct 
attacks against individual Soviet tanks noting that "each pilot tried 
to hit one tank," and elaborating that only direct hits successfully 
destr.oyed the tanks. The argument is effectively made that aircraft 
expand the area available to the ground commander, in this case, 
the commander of the Sixth Army, to counter the armor threat. Hozzel 
makes the final point, however, that the bomb armament on the Stukas 
allowed them to operate comfortably deep within enemy territory, 
whereas the later gun armament restricted the maneuverability of the 
aircraft to the extent that with guns as installed on the JU-87 
Stuka, "one could attack enemy tanks only very close to one's own 
front lines." 
After the insertion of the comments of the European experts into 
the first seminar topic, the seminar chairman began the challenging 
talk of either gathering together the consensus on the topic or 
delineating the range of conflicting views. In the first topic, 
there was a solid consensus that fixed-wing aircraft possessed certain 
inherent characteristics which gave them special strengths in the 
antitank role. Those characteristics can be summarized as follows: 
Characteristic 
1. Mobility: 





3-Dimensional Atk Angles 
a. Weapons Load ...••..• Heavy, Varied Ordnance 
b. Structural Strength ..•.. Survivability, Recoil Absorption 




Loiter. . • . . . • . . . • Rapid Tactical Response 
Firepower on Target Surge ..• 
4. Survivability .. 
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• • High Damage Resistance 






Although it can be said that a consensus was achieved on the 
characteristics shown in the listing above, it must be noted that 
the Marine Corps and Navy emphasized the following points. The points, 
which are oblique to the present topic, are important ones because 
they lead directly into the schism which wracked the seminar during 
discussion of the remaining seven topics. The Marine Corps major 
present at the seminar emphasized the idea that he did not feel an 
aircraft, which is dedicated to antitank defense, could be accepted 
by the Marine Corps. Implied in the statement was the logic that 
discussion of fixed-wing aircraft characteristics from the viewpoint 
of antitank effectiveness was invalid because all combat aircraft 
should have the widest possible mission profile. The Navy lieutenant 
commander who addressed the topic questions during the first afternoon 
made a similar point by addressing the following question (rhetorically) 
to the attendees: what are the best uses of naval aircraft? Implied 
in the question was the point that naval aircraft, when analyzed from 
the viewpoint naval missions (sea control, etc.), can be only mildly 
oriented toward an antitank role. 
The positions of the Naval and Marine Corps officers, which implied 
that aircraft with broad mission profiles were mandatory for the Navy 
and economically desirable and tactically preferred by the Marine Corps, 
were accentuated by the competition for resources between those services 
and the Air Force. The Navy and Marine Corps are presently developing 
and buying expensive aircraft which reflect not only perceptions of 
service mission needs but also general thoughts about the more specific 
necessities of combat. The Air Force is engaged in the same process 
of aircraft acquisition with similar conditions of perception and 
necessity. It rapidly became apparent that the comments, which were 
made by the Marine Corps and Navy officers, were colored by the 
perceived need to defend their own services' (largely valid) developments 
against those of the Air Force under the difficult conditions of 
commenting at a seminar dedicated to air antitank warfare. But what was 
difficult about the conditions? The answer rapidly became apparent 
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and can be described as follows: Air Force A-10 aircraft recently 
developed and now in series production with their internally mounted 
30mm Gatling guns and CAS missions within the tank-heavy Central 
European area, affected the seminar as they do the attack aircraft 
scene today. As the seminar moved on, the natural tendency developed 
for the A-10 to be a yardstick against which to measure the answers 
to the topic questions. The Marine Corps and Navy officers became 
inclined generally to criticize the A-10 categorically as too big, 
too sl.ow, etc. rather than to analyze it constructively with a view 
toward improvement of their own services' antitank capabilities. 
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THE SEMINAR: TOPIC II 
The second topic was not as broad in scope as the first but 
was impressively general in the sense that it directed attention 
to all of the fixed-wing aircraft held by the U.S. armed forces. 
The attendees at the seminar had just considered the grand question 
of whether or not fixed-wing aircraft should be used to attack difficult 
ground targets like main battle tanks. The consensus, modified subtlely 
by the drift of the Marine and Naval officers away from direct addressal 
to the topics and consideration of missions and situations in which 
tank attacks were less likely than in the Central European scenario, 
was that fixed wing aircraft possessed certain characteristics which 
made them uniquely important for inclusion in any scheme of antitank 
defense. The attendees, having committed themselves to the use of 
fixed-wing aircraft, were now asked to consider the question: choosing 
from the total of U.S. fixed-wing combat air assets, which aircraft 
and in what priority should be used in the antitank role? 
The Air Force lieutenant colonel1 , who was the first to address 
the question after the introduction by the chairman, made the point 
in the spirit of the comments by Rudel, that any aircraft used in the 
antitank role" ... must have a weapon which can kill a tank." He 
continued to say that the A-10 aircraft which was structured around a 
tank-killing automatic cannon and designed for close air support was 
a particularly effective choice for first priority in attack against 
armored vehicles. The air force officer noted that "the A-10 can carry, 
of course, all of the other weapons ... " which may in many situations 
complement attacks with automatic cannon and be able effectively to 
immobilize, damage, or catastrophically kill tanks. The logic which 
developed was that the A-10 was the rough equivalent of any other attack 
aircraft available to the U.S. Armed Forces except for its unique cannon, 
extraordinary attention to survivability, and relatively low speed. 
Colonel R. Dilger, USAF, sounded a warning note at this time that even 
aircraft deeply involved in antitank combat would have to do "more 
11TC J. Dempsey, USAF 
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pos~ibly than just kill tanks ... ", implying the necessity to design 
as much versatility as possible into CAS aircraft. After the above 
trend of conversation, the Air Force officers courageously identified 
the following three aircraft as their choices for tank hunting in order 
of preference: (1) Fairchild A-10, (2) Vought A-7, and (3) McDonnell F-4. 
The Marine Corps major addressed himself to the question by noting 
that he did not feel there could or would be an overall U.S. Marine 
Corps position or doctrine on the most effective Marine fixed-wing 
aircraft for attack on tanks. He stated that local commander's 
choice should probably dictate the type of aircraft to be employed. 
In stating his position he implied and then specifically noted that 
the "tank is just another target." The statement and the line of 
reasoning which it represents tends to downgrade severely the importance 
of the tank in modern warfare. If one tends to accept the statement, 
he must feel the absurdity, for example, of discussing the type of 
aircraft which should attack troops in the operi, light field fortifi-
cations, light four-wheeled trucks, etc., because it becomes plainly 
apparent that most aircraft flown by most pilots can inflict necessary 
levels of damage. On the other hand, Soviet ground warfare strategy, 
tactics, organization, and training literally pivot on the main battle 
tank which is the final measure of fire and maneuver for the Soviet Army. 
And the tank as organized in the Soviet ground forces must rank as an 
extraordinarily difficult target to acquire, attack, and destroy. The 
Marine Corps officer was then asked by the chairman to consider within 
a specific scenario of the tank being a special threat to U.S. ground 
forces, the question: what would be your priority of aircraft employment? 
Emphasizing the cogent point that day and night attack should be considered 
in such a question, the Marine officer committed himself to the view that 
the Douglas A-4 would probably be most effective with the AV8 Harrier 
aircraft next in effectiveness. He felt that the special conditions 
of night attack would require a sophisticated sensor-equipped aircraft 
like the A-6. 
The Navy lieutenant commander, who was initially spokesman among 
the naval attendees for the aircraft topic, commented on the potential 
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effectiveness of the recently acquired Marine Corps AV8 Harrier 
aircraft in the antitank role, pointing out its flexibility in 
being able to operate without prepared runways. On the subject 
of naval aircraft for use in the antitank role, the naval attendee 
made the significant comment that "almost any could do the job". 
The comment reflects a naval mindcast which began to develop parallel 
with the Marine Corps officer's view that a tank is just another 
target. From another viewpoint, since naval aircraft have not been 
dev~ldped with special emphasis on tank hunting, it is substantially 
accurate for the naval officer to state that almost any naval aircraft 
~ do the job or perhaps almost any naval aircraft will have to do 
the job. Since no Naval (or Marine Corps) aircraft presently has a 
built-in ·weapon system which will seriously annoy Soviet main battle 
tanks, one probably must consider the question of what ordnance is 
available to be carried by Naval aircraft on external mountings 
prior to accepting the idea that almost any naval service aircraft 
could effectively engage tanks. The naval lieutenant commander, 
however, cleared up the issue for purposes of the seminar by noting 
that although he could not prioritize the use of naval aircraft in 
order of potential antitank capability, he could state that the A-4, 
A-6, A-7, and AV8 aircraft should all be able to conduct effective 
attacks against tanks with existing cluster weapons. 
The Army colonel present at the seminar and currently stationed 
at Fort Rucker, Alabama, noted that agreements were in effect which 
designated a mix of attack aircraft in the air-land battle to include 
fixed-wing aircraft from the Air Force and helicopters from the Army. 
He felt that the A-7 aircraft of the Air Force and Navy, and the newer 
A-10 Air Force aircraft in combination with Army Cobra (TCM) and AH-6 
helicopters represented an effective mix of antitank aircraft. The 
Army major present at the seminar and attending from the Ballistic 
Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, noted with 
decision and energy that the Army needs all the support it can get 
in order to master the armor threat in Central Europe. "Tanks must 
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be killed ... ", he said and fixed wing aircraft must be a credible 
part of the attack equation " ... probably using missiles and guns". 
Following the remarks of the Army attendees, Mr. V. Tizzio of 
the Fairchild Republic Company, Farmingdale, New York, who represented 
the manufacturers of the A-10 aircraft, stated that tanks are so 
numerous and important in the Central European area that ground weapons 
and many other aircraft with a wide variety of capabilities are 
needed for survival. Mr. Tizzio had emphasized the especially strong 
maneuverability and structural survivability of the A-10 during the 
previous topic discussion. He felt that along with its automatic 
cannon the A-10 aircraft had characteristics which provided it with 
unique effectiveness in combat over the FEBA in marginal weather. 
American industry had more to say about the question of what 
aircraft in what priority to employ in the antitank role. Mr. T. E. 
Gaines of the Vought Corporation, Dallas, Texas, made two particularly 
significant observations which run as follows. First, he emphasized 
that he did not feel it was necessary to select in some order of 
priority particular aircraft from among several capable of performing 
in the antitank role. To specify an order of priority, he felt one would 
have to provide a list of caveats which would establish a particular 
"situation and terrain" for specific consideration. Future situations 
and terrain, which can also be called scenarios (necessarily fictional 
futures), could in fact have been used but not within the time limits 
of the seminar or similar types of meetings. The topic "assumed" a 
single grand scenario namely war in Europe involving in the beginning 
a massive offensive by Warsaw Pact forces westward toward the Atlantic 
and at the end a counterthrust eastward by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) forces. The threat in Europe for more than a 
quarter of a century has been linked indissolubly with an anticipated 
Soviet/Warsaw Pact ground offensive westward. Linked with that ground 
offensive are massive Warsaw Pact armored and air attacks which are 
supplemented by the factors of concentration of effort and surprise on 
the part of the attacker. Under such circumstances, i.e., the first 




.! will be on the defensive, struggling to gain air superiority and 
attempting to support hard-pressed ground forces which will require 
CAS on or near the FEBA. Within the outlined, generally accepted 
scenario, tank hunting will probably be associated largely with 
CAS situations and the assignment of priorities of aircraft antitank 
eff~ctiveness a necessary step in order to develop the successful 
tactical doctrine for the aircraft selected for partial dedication 
to the antitank role in Europe. 
Mr. Gaines secondly challenged the consensus which he sensed 
was developing among the Air Force officers at the seminar that, 
if priorities for antitank employment were set, the A-10 would be 
the best overall choice. ''While recognizing the special and unique 
attributes of the A-10 (especially the benefits of the 30mm gun) ... ", 
Mr. Gaines made the point that other aircraft, especially the A-7, 
could be superior if analysis of effectiveness were extended across 
the entire spectrum of attack aircraft operations to include both 
CAS and interdiction. Relative to the grand scenario in Central 
Europe, interdiction by NATO tactical air would probably develop 
after the air superiority and close air support operations associated 
with the initial westward movement of Soviet armor and increase in 
importance during that rarely addressed part of the general scenario 
in which the NATO ground forces seize the initiative and advance 
eastward. One must be struck by the increased effectiveness of A-7, 
Marine Corps A-4, A-6, F-4 and similar aircraft in the transition 
toward and attainment of the second part of the Central European 
scenario in which the war turns in favor of the West. During the 
latter half of the scenario, Western aircraft used in ground attack 
will begin to interdict a faltering enemy's lines of communication. 
Under the general circumstances of increasing opportunity for 
interdiction, effective aircraft attack against tanks ·will probably 
remain a rather specialized task involving challenging acquisition 
problems, eye contact with targets, and uniquely accurate and lethal 
weapons to damage main battle tanks. The aircraft on the antitank 
shopping list, e.g., A-10, A-7, A-6, A-4, F-4, etc., would seem to be 
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more closely bunched under the circumstances of interdiction, but 
when one addresses himself to the question of direct attack against 
tanks within the interdiction role, the edge may continue to lie 
with the CAS-type aircraft. 
At this juncture in the topic, Colonel Rudel was introduced as 
if he were actually present. The chairman of the seminar, who 
represented the Colonel based on previous interviews, addressed 
himself to the following question modified for Second World War German 
consideration: choosing from the total of German aircraft assets 
of early 1943, ans·wer the question in what priority did the High 
Command of the Air Force (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL)) determine 
which aircraft would be employed in the AT role? Rudel emphasized 
that problems of target acquisition and target survivability pre-
dominated in the antitank game from the air. The OKL, accordingly, 
authorized the modification of the D-variation of the JU-87 aircraft, 
to take the Luftwaffe FLAK 18 (Fleugzeugabwehrkanone) (antiaircraft 
defense cannon) cannon and additio?al armor protection, etc .. The 
aircraft was maneuverable and agile at relatively low speeds, a 
stable gun platform, and structurally strong. The two cannons, 
which were each mounted outside of the landing gear, weighed more 
than one-thousand pounds apiece and with their long barrels and 
various appurtenances degraded the original maneuverability of the 
aircraft. The cannon, especially with the Wolfram projectiles and 
higher velocity modifications, was lethal over significant areas which 
were presented to air attack, especially the top of the engine and 
fighting compartments and top and rear of the turret. The cannon, 
Rudel emphasized, was accurate enough to assure impacts on rather 
small areas of the tank, e.g., within 30cm (12in) of selected aiming 
points at ranges of 200m. 
The interviewers asked the Colonel several other questions within 
the topic framework of aircraft. He was asked, for example: what type 
of aircraft would you have developed as the ideal antitank aircraft if 
you had had the time and resources to do so? Rudel remarked that he 
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liked the 37mm ~ 18 cannon and would have (1) built the aircraft 
around a cannon, and (2) designed the aerodynamics of the resulting 
aircraft to extract the maximum flight performance from what would 
be essentially a "cannon-bird". In a challenging statement for 
aircraft powerplant designers, Rudel noted that his ideal aircraft 
~ould have to possess the conflicting characteristics of (1) operating 
at low speed (350 km/hr, 215 mph) and with high maneuverability during 
target acquisition and attack, and (2) accelerating away from the target 
area rapidly to a higher top speed of approximately 800 km/hr (500 mph). 
He mentioned, finally, that armor protection for the pilot and certain 
exposed, crucial parts of the aircraft structure and engine would be 
necessary. He warned, however, that protection must not be bought 
at the expense of the pilot's field of view. 
Brigadier General Hozzel also addressed himself to the broad 
question of what aircraft should be employed in the antitank role. 
He pointed out that "turn-around time and sortie generation are all 
important." He favored a sturdy, accurate dive bomber like the 
Stuka based about 50 kms behind the FEBA. In spite of his success with 
Stukas in bombing attacks against Soviet tanks at Kalach in September 
1942, Hozzel felt that a gun-armed, Stuka-like aircraft would give 
the best results in great defensive battles like those in the East 
from late 1943-1945. Hozzel feels that, given the conditions of 
defense against strong enemy mobile forces, antitank aircraft must be 
capable of rapid movement among unprepared landing areas just beyond 
the reach of potential enemy armored thrusts. He noted that the existence 
of a general defensive situation would restrict friendly attack 
aircraft largely to the CAS mode of operation close to the modern FEBA 
with little chance of effective interdiction against attacking enemy 
ground forces. 
Consensus on the question of what aircraft to employ in what 
priority in the antitank role could not be achieved under Topic II. 
A series of views was presented by the attendees which could not be 
sorted out to construct a single seminar viewpoint. The best which 
could be done was to identify the various views and organize them clearly 
for posterity. 
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The following diagram shows roughly what developed within the topic: 
ATTENDEES AIRCRAFT PRIORITY IN ANTITANK ROLE 





USMC- - - - - - - - - - -(1) A-4, (2) AV8 (A-6, for night attack) 
USN - - - - - - - - -No Priority. A-4, A-6, A-7, AV8 all effective. 
USA - - - - - - - - - - -No Priority. A-10 & A-7 particularly effective. 
0Industry 
a. Fairchild- (1) A-10 
b. Vought - - - - (1) A-7, (2) A-10 (Combined CAS & Interdiction 
Scenarios) 
6. Euroexperts - - - - - - Sturdy Platform built around lethal AT weapon 
with strong low speed maneuverability, high 
get away speed. 
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!!ill. SEMINAR: TOPIC III 
The third topic for discussion represented a logical progression 
from the general to the particular,proceeding as it did from consideration 
of aircraft to the ordnance carried by those weapons platforms. The 
topic question unfolds as follows: choosing from the total U.S. air 
weapons assets, answer the question, what weapons in which priority 
should be employed in the antitank role? The Air Force lieutenant 
colonel, prefacing his comments by noting that his priorities were 
meant to take account of the "environment of war", gave the following 
priorities: (1) 30mm Gatling gun and Maverick guided missile, (2) 
Rockeye antitank cluster munition, (3) aerially-delivered antitank 
mines. The Army major interjected a comment at this time in which he 
noted the desirability of 24-hour a day CAS operations against hard, 
mobile targets like tanks and ref1ected that neither guns, guided 
missiles, nor clusters are effective for such operations. The Air 
Force colonel noted that no aircraft weapon exists at present with 
an effective night capability against deployed tanks. He went on to 
remark additionally that serious problems exist with low visibility 
in Central Europe during the winter months. Low visibility which combines 
elements of water, dust, and smoke particles can severely degrade the 
performance of Maverick, Rockeye, and laser guided bombs. Automatic 
cannon systems are least inhibited by poor weather conditions because 
of the extraordinary reliability, high velocity, and lack of arming 
problems associated with guns. The Air Force colonel developed 
priorities as follows: (1) 30mm Gatling gun and Maverick guided missile, 
(2) Laser Guided Bombs, (3) Rockeye antitank cluster munition. 
The attendees who were on active duty with the Naval Service 
cooperatively discussed priorities for weapons employment against 
tanks. The Marine major present, restricting himself to ordnance 
available to the Marine Corps offered the following priorities for 
use against tsnks and other armored vehicles: (1) Rockeye, (2) APAM, 
(3) Laser Guided Bombs, (4) Walleye. He stated that Rockeye could 
be particularly effective under conditions of high visibility against 
tanks in column on roads. The Naval lieutenant commander speaking from 




California, made the point that the "Navy does want guns", but needs 
one roughly 25-30mm in bore diameter with high impulse ammunition, 
neither of which is available in the Navy at present. In the absence 
of a gun option, and addressing himself to the effectiveness of ordnance 
against tanks, he ventured the priorities: (1) Rockeye, (2) APAM. 
· The Army officers present emphasized real-world problems of target 
acquisition, the position identification of enemy tanks, and the safety 
of friendly troops also as important ones to consider in selecting 
antitank ordnance for aircraft. Colonel R. L. Sauers, USA, noted that 
point targets are difficult in general to locate, and armored, mobile 
targets like tanks and mechanized infantry combat vehicles could be 
difficult for friendly aircraft in Central Europe to find, let along 
damage. The chairman of the seminar reinforced Col Sauers' comment 
at this time by noting how emphatically Rudel had stated that more 
than half of his job in catastrophically destroying 519 Soviet tanks 
was finding them. The colonel continued discussion by describing the 
Army preference for precision and accuracy in CAS and in doing so 
perhaps eliminated the use of Rockeye as a viable choice for attacks 
near the FEBA. Major O. L. Mullen, USA, emphasized the need for fixed-
wing aircraft weapon systems which can successfully damage tanks in 
low visibility daylight conditions and at night, and positively distinguish 
between friendly and enemy targets. Probably wisely and with generous 
measures of hum.ility and tact, neither Army officer suggested priorities 
in the employment of fixed-wing air antitank weapons. 
Representatives of American industry had several comments on the 
subject of aircraft antitank ordnance. Mr. Suydam (General Electric) 
remarked that automatic cannon with appropriate characteristics of 
armor penetration, accuracy, and rate of fire offer proven destruction 
of tanks in combat in the historical past, and under more recent range 
conditions. He suggested the arming of other aircraft besides the 
A-10 with a similar but lighter weight, 4-barreled 30mm Gatling gun 
with a firing rate of approximately 2400 rds/min and placed in pods on 
dedicated pylons. The lighter-weight cannon with high firing rate and 









represent a decisive improvement in Marine Corps and Navy ordnance 
given the present dearth of effective antitank cannons in those 
services. Mr. Warden (Aerojet) mentioned the simplicity, reliability, 
and readiness of guns and gun ammunition. He implied that what should 
be desirable for the services are available, effective weapon systems; 
a~d guns are available and effective especially with present "podding 
technology". Mr. D. G. Opheim of Honeywell, Incorporated, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, introduced the idea of a standard antitank ordnance mix 
consisting of gun (or guns) and clusters. The load carrying capabilities 
of modern attack aircraft give them, in fact, the opportunity to carry 
potent mixes of antitank ordnance and maintain effective aerodynamic 
maneuverability. Mr. Opheim also emphasized the potential usefulness 
of antitank mines scattered from aircraft. 
Now, approaching the end of the third topic, the seminar chairman 
introduced the Eastern Front experts in terms of a special variation 
of the topic question designed to extract their combat experiences: 
choosing from the total of German Air Force ordnance (weapons) assets 
of 1943-1945, answer the question, what weapons in what priority were 
selected for employment in the antitank role? Colonel Rudel stated 
that guns were ideal for the conditions under which he had fought. 
He pointed out that the vintage 1944, 37mm guns on his aircraft had 
muzzle velocities substantially higher than the 30mm GAU-8/A cannons 
of today. He constantly returned to the theme of the accuracy of his 
guns and the lethality of the heavy, metallurgically tough Wolfram 
projectiles fired with muzzle velocities of approximately 3,700 ft/sec. 
General Hozzel, who was queried on the same topic, commented boisterously, 
"Rudel had immense success with guns ... so use guns ... ". Driving the 
logic of the moment as far as it would go, Hozzel said half facetiously 
and half seriously, "if you think you have a better aircraft than the 
JU-87, why not try a more effective gun, or taking the example of Rudel, 
if he was successful with two 37mm guns, why not try four 37mm guns?" 
To a certain extent what the general suggested is what the U.S. Air 
Force has recently done. The GAU-8/A with it 30mm APIT (armor piercing 










of the older German gun but has a rate of fire roughly four times as 
great. In effect, the U.S. Air Force has "tried" four of Rudel' s 
guns on its A-10 CAS aircraft. 
The attendees made some decisive comments on fixed-wing aircraft 
ordnance for use against tanks, but for various reasons little apparent 
concensus developed. The antitank weapons and their priority of 
effectiveness within the general scenario of initial defensive operations 
in a tank heavy theater of war had emerged as follows: 
ATTENDEES ORDNANCE PRIORITY, AIRCRAFT IN ANTITANK ROLE 
1. USAF-------------------(!) Gun & Maverick,(2) Rockeye,(3).LGB,(4) AT Mines 
2. USMC-------------------(!) Rockeye,(2) APAM,(3) LGB,(4)Walleye 
3. USN---------------------(1) Rockeye,(2) APAM,((l) Gun when developed) 
4. USA--------------------- - no fixed-wing priorities -
5. Industry 
a. General Electric-----(!) Gun 
b. Aerojet--------------(1) Gun 
c. Honeywell------------(1) Gun & Rockeye, (2) AT Mines 
6. Euroexperts-------------(1) Gun 
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~ SEMINAR : !QITQ. IV 
The fourth topic centered on fixed-wing pilot selection for 
antitank warfare. The organizers of the seminar addressed the 
following question to the attendees: are the conditions of antitank 
warfare so unique as to justify special selection for pilots? If 
so, what characteristics should be sought out for pilots who fly 
primarily in the antitank role? The topic was an intriguing one 
from the viewpoint that it opened up the sensitive area of the 
relative merits of the various kinds of armed forces pilots, e.g. 
fighter, attack, bomber, transport. In spite of potential sensitivi-
ties, the possibility exists that there are conditions in antitank 
warfare which are both unique and_important enough to demand a special 
kind of pilot. If those conditions can be agreed upon to exist, one 
can drive to the final point which is to correlate the special conditions 
of antitank warfare with the human physiological and psychological cha-
racteristics capable of mastering them. 
Several Air Force officers came from Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, 
to comment on the results of flying antitank sorties with live ammunition · 
and special tactics to master the perceived air defense threat. One 
of them, Major W. McDermot, elaborated on the problems of flying a CAS 
aircraft (A-10) under trying multi-sortie conditions and against 
simulated air defenses. His comments were concise and decisive. He 
stated that pilot fatigue was a problem "even in single missions". 
He noted that the fatigue was so great on occasion as to have the 
characteristics of physical illness. The Nellis antitank pilots were 
using low level tactics in order to master the simulated air defense 
networks. Those pilots found that the combination of flying low and 
acquiring and attacking tanks demands physical hardening of the pilot 
and suggests the need for a special relationship between the pilots 
and the supported ground troops. 
The Marine Corps major spoke, as one might expect, with authority 
on the necessity for close integration of air and ground forces. He 







In. de? Kamel seiner Ju f!l: Der ,,iliegc:nde l'am.erioci: 
SKETCH ONE: Associate Professor Russel U.S. Stolfi (right) and 
his thesis student, Captain Lonnie 0. Ratley, III, USAF, (left) 
helped to organize the Air Antitank Seminar based on their work 
together at the Naval Postgraduate School on German Second World 
War aerial operations-. Captain Ratley is presently (1977) serving 
at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 
-·--- -·-- -- ·--··--···---·-····· ,--· ... " . - -··...:-·__::--:::::· =-·-=--·=·--:__· __:_:==:..::--.:..·;;:· :.;;.;__;_ ____________________ ...., _________ ... 
Marine Corps attack pilot (1) receives the same basic (approximately 
6-8 months) infantry training as ground officers, and (2) serves at 
least one year as a forward air controller (FAC) or air liaison officer 
with an infantry organization. The major commented on the relatively 
low altitude movements and strikes which are being run in the Marine 
Cotps with the new AVB Harrier aircraft. Unfortunately for purposes 
of the seminar question, the major did not elaborate on whether or 
not he felt that special conditions exist in antitank attack which 
require special characteristics presently neither identified nor 
sought after in Marine Pilots who may participate in large scale 
antitank operations. The Marine attendee implied strongly in his 
comments that the uniquely undoctrinated Marine Corps aviators (1) 
already had a powerfully cultivated empathy with the ground troops, 
and (2) already had been selected for an air arm whose overall mission 
was CAS for a large ground force. Since the Marine attendee had clung 
to the view in previous topics that the "tank is just another target", 
it can be assumed in the present topic that his silence means that no 
special conditions accrue to air antitank warfare. 
The comments of the Naval attendees were emphatic and clear. 
The Naval officers commented that a special type of pilot was probably 
not required for air antitank warfare. They noted with some professional 
pleasure that landing aboard the carrier even after a combat sortie 
was "the big event of the day". They reiterated their previous positions 
about the unexceptional nature of tank hunting by noting that an 
"antitank FEBA (was) not really a different situation", and the Navy, 
in any case, would not attack in multiple passes. In a particularly 
interesting statement, one of the Naval officers commented that tactics 
are the big problem and not really pilots. The statement is difficult 
to challenge because it can scarcely be denied that tactics are ~ big 
problem. Observed from a slightly different perspective, however, tactics 
can be seen to be developed and employed by pilots whose (1) personal 
characteristics, and (2) capabilities and spirit in the tank hunting role, 








The senior attendee at the seminar from the Army was Colonel 
R. L. Sauers, a helicopter pilot, whose views he expressly stated 
were colored by the special necessities of helicopter flight. Colonel 
Sauers felt that attack pilots could be placed together usefully in 
a single group and analyzed from the viewpoint of desirable character-
istics: He did not feel that it was necessary to subdivide the group 
on the basis of special characteristics for attacking particular 
targets. His Army helicopter experience may be exerting an effect 
in these circumstances because the Army has observation, transport, 
and weapons-ship helicopters. In contrast, in the weapons category, 
the Air Force and Navy have clearly drawn major distinctions among 
their "weapons-aircraft", namely fighter, attack, strategic bomber, 
and in the case of the Navy, antisubmarine warfare aircraft. The 
colonel felt that the Class One and Class Two flight physicals of 
the Army were important guides for characteristics desirable in attack 
pilots. He stated, finally, in a pessimistic note, that special 
problems continue to plague pilots in night attack situations noting 
that "pilots have not been effective at night ..• ". 
First-hand experience in training and air combat were desirable 
· for a person to be comfortable in handling the question of whether 
or not special characteristics should be sought out for antitank pilots, 
and the attendees from U.S. industry were largely listeners during Topic 
IV. Mr. Warden (Aerojet) remarked, nevertheless, that in air attack 
against ground targets especially with guns that eyes and eyesight could 
be particularly important for success. Additional comments by other 
attendees included the statement by Dr. J. Clemens, Wright Patterson 
Air Force Base, Ohio, that "men who like to put themselves in a 
situation of stress and enjoy doing so ... ", may be the most effective 
psychological types. Commander L. Kaufman, USN, Naval Weapons Center, 
China Lake, California, made the observation that the "loner", or 
highly self-contained person, could be especially effective in the 
attack role against challenging targets like tanks. Although the 
world has had its share of gregarious combat pilots, one is struck 





combat achievement - Richthofen, Hartmann, Rudel, Marseille. 1 
The Euroexperts were asked somewhat different questions to 
extract their experiences on the Eastern Front. The first question 
took the form: what characteristics did you emphasize in your 
selection of pilots for training or redeployment in antitank aircraft? 
Rudel, who was strongly influenced by his immense success with guns, 
stated that the physiological capability to strafe was close to the 
top in importance. He distinguished later in the interview between 
the total evolution of strafing and the part of it which involved 
being "a good shot", noting that both were important. He emphasized 
that the antitank pilot should be "more a soldier than a pilot", and 
made the additional point that "he is an infantryman of the air". 
He reiterated the point in various ways stating at one juncture 
that "air-to-air combat requires pilots first and soldiers second, 
but that antitank combat requires soldiers first and pilots second". 
He used the expression that antitank pilots as special attack pilots 
must have empathy for the ground troops and "must be infantry of the 
air even more than effective strafers". Rudel mentioned also that 
it was often difficult to keep new attack pilots alive notwithstanding 
how outstanding their natural and training school capabilities had been. 
He felt that the first several combat sorties by new pilots were 
frustrating for him as commander because "inexperienced pilots simply 
waste ammunition". The same sorties were also enormously dangerous 
for the new pilots because of the strong air defenses around the 
Soviet tanks. 
Rudel mentioned that under the stress of dangerous attacks in 
the face of strong Soviet antiaircraft defenses and difficulties in 
obtaining killing impacts on tanks, many pilots went to pieces turning 
to alcohol and neglecting their health and physical (athletic) conditioning. 
Circumstances were difficult because of the primitive operating 
lRichthofen first in air-to-air combat WW I, 85 confirmed victories. 
Hartmann first in air-to-air combat WW II, 352 confirmed victories. 
Rudel, o~tstanding attack aviator in aviation history, 2,530 combat 
sorties. 









conditions, the enormous pressures on the ground troops, vast 
Soviet numerical superiority in the air, and unfriendly civilian 
populations. Rudel stated that he concentrated on maintaining a 
superlative state of physical conditioning by running six miles 
daily, swimming, and carrying in his cockpit a discus, 16-lb shot, 
and javelin in order to work out at any advanced strip in-between 
sorties while the Gustav (Stuka model G) was being refueled, re-
ammunitioned, maintained, and repaired. He stated that his physical 
conditioning program achieved two vital objectives: (1) his physical 
reflexes and capabilities were maximized, and (2) the physical conditioning 
proved to be a profoundly effective psychological therapy, which took 
his mind away from brooding on the dangers and inconveniences of the 
moment and substituted a stabilizing regimen. 
General Hozzel began to discuss the European version of the 
question by noting that the German fighter-bomber or attack 
(Schlachtflieger) and dive-bomber (Sturzkampffleugzeug, (Stuka)) 
pilots originally came out of the fighter school located at Munich. 1 
Hozzel states that the most gifted selectees for flight training 
went to the fighter school and the elite which emerged "all switched 
around among fighter (Me-109), attack (Hs-123), and Stuka (Ju-87) 
aircraft before the war.'' Hozzel went on to describe how the attack 
pilots became the infantry of the air and how, by 1943, attack and 
dive bomber aviation had merged into combined organizations because 
of the problems of rising Soviet fighter strength. Both the attack 
aircraft and the dive bombers were forced to operate close to the 
FEBA because of the difficulties in operating in an interdiction 
mode against the large numbers of Soviet fighter aircraft. As the 
war developed, especially after 1941, the Stuka and attack pilots 
also suffered a lowering of quality as the tendency developed for 
the best (top 10 percent) pilots at the fighter school to be assigned 
as fighter pilots, and for the Stuka and attack pilots to come from 
the level bombing and even transport pilot schools. 
lrn late 1943, the distinction between attack and dive bomber pilots 
was reduced with both types of pilots being referred to as Schlachtflieger 





Hozzel, who was influenced by his pre-war, high quality dive 
bomber training in which "one year was allowed for bombing alone", 
did not feel that tanks presented special problems on the battlefield. 
He remarked that pilots, who can attack any ground targets, can attack 
tanks. On the other hand, he stated that there were characteristics 
of Rudel which were uniquely developed--competiveness, for example--
and evidently contributed to his astounding success. Hozzel went 
on to describe the characteristics which he associates with success 
in fighter and attack aircraft combat. The words which he used to 
describe the successful pilots were: alert, quick in reaction, vital, 
alive, and a certain character of indiscipline in an unobjectionable 
sense. He summed up his general thoughts about successful fighter 
and attack pilots with the statement that "the decisive point seems 
to be a particular natural alertness." 
Consensus did not develop during the discussion of Topic IV to 
a considerable extent because the chairman could not maintain attendee 
focus on the potential special conditions of antitank warfare. The 
later Topics V, VI, and VII emphasized tactics and tactical conditions 
for air antitank warfare, and, if they had preceded Topic IV, they 
would have provided more background for the discussion of pilot 
characteristics and a sharper focus on those potential antitank warfare 
characteristics. The views which developed can be summarized as 
follows: 
ATTENDEES ANTITANK PILOT CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Air Force--------------------Physical Fitness Greater than Fighter 
Pilots. Empathy with Ground Troops. 
Duty Tour with Army. 
2. Marine Corps-----------------None. Tanks are Just Another Target. 
Pilot empathy with troops already Marine 
hallmark 
3. Navy-------------------------None. Any Naval Combat Aircraft and Pilot 
WHl Do. 
4. Army-------------------------Empathy with Ground Troops. Pilot Ground 
Indoctrination Tour. 
5. Industry (Aerojet)-----------Special Eyesight. 
6. Euroexp~rts------------------Acquired Superior Physical.C~ndition. 
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Genetic Alertness. Competitiveness. 





The Air Force, Army, and Euroexperts sense to some significant 
degree the emergence of a new man in the combat aviation world. His 
characteristics are those of acquired exceptional physical condition 
and a special mental state which makes him as much a storm soldier 
as a pilot. Elements of inbred (literally genetic) alertness and 
exceptional competitiveness partially complete the picture. Rudel 
feels that all of the above characteristics when merged result in 
a man with a special kind of spirit called by the Germans, Geist, 
and roughly described in English as an indomitable will. Rudel went 
so far as to present the thought-provoking observation that in final, 
crucial combat clashes when victory hands by a slender thread, that 
neither the aircraft nor the weapon matters. The deciding factor 
is the spirit of the pilot--der Geist. Even taking account of 
modern wars of materiel and the noteworthy lack of bulletproof 
pilots, one senses that the observation is a worthwhile one. 
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THE SEMINAR: TOPIC V 
The fifth topic for discussion pressed into the area of tactics 
and was entered by the attendees through the question: taking into 
consideration the entire air-land battle, what physical areas offer 
th~ most substantial advantages in attacking tanks? The question was 
couched within the framework of the general Central European scenario, 
namely Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces pushing NATO forces westward following 
a partial surprise attack. At some indeterminate future time after 
the start of hostilities, one should assume a NATO seizure of the 
initiatives and resulting attack eastward. The Air Force colonel 
from Nellis AFB, made the point that the antitank aircraft should 
be employed to support the ground force commander's scheme of 
maneuver. In the general Central European scenario the Soviets will 
have seized the initiative and the U.S. Army and other NATO commanders 
will be largely reacting to Warsaw Pact attacks. The question which 
remains is: what area represents a credible one for antitank attack 
for tactical air forces of NATO, which are placed on the strategic and 
probably the local defensive along the entire front in Central Europe? 
Captain J. Jumper, USAF, one of the energetic young pilots from 
the Fighter Weapons' School, Nellis AFB, presented the idea of a force 
mix of several types of aircraft to take advantage of the rather 
different conditions which will exist from the FEBA to deep within 
the enemy's zone of communications. Higher speed aircraft would 
in a three-dimensional sense by-pass (or over-pass) Warsaw Pact 
breakthrough forces, engage second echelon forces, and attack first 
echelon forces from the rear. Aircraft with strong CAS characteristics 
would predominate where friendly ground forces are engaged with the 
enemy especially under unfavorable weather conditions for the employment 
of air. This scheme, which might be called the enlightened air-land 
battle aircraft mix, would probably work out particularly successfully 
when the NATO forces regained the initiative. In the most popular 
first half of the general Central European scenario, the hard-pressed 
NATO attack aircraft will probably be engaged in CAS type activity 
against first echelon Soviet breakthrough forces in what might be 
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-termed fire brigade type operations. 
Attendees from the Air Staff, U.S. Air Force, made observations 
similar to those of Capt Jumper. Using a concept of effective 
management of available forces they posed the question: why not 
make deeper strikes in less contested areas? The air staff attendees 
suggested A-7 and F-4 aircraft for strikes against second echelon 
forces and beyond. They felt that the A-10 aircraft would be most 
successful in attacks against first echelon forces. The objections 
to the above "management" of forces are similar to those in the 
preceding paragraph. The general Central European scenario presents 
the Warsaw Pact forces as having seized the initiative with powerful 
ground, air defense, and tactical air forces moving in accordance 
with predetermined plans and anticipating the various possible 
reactions of the NATO forces. Again it would appear that the NATO 
tactical air forces will be (1) struggling for control of the air, 
and (2) providing CAS for highly stressed NATO ground forces. Once 
the battle for air superiority begins to swing in favor of the West, 
greater opportunities should appear for interdiction of the Warsaw 
Pact ground forces. The question of where to attack enemy tank forces 
most effectively appears to answer itself when the enemy is on the 
offensive, namely near the FEBA in CAS type operations. The question 
of where to attack enemy armor when friendly forces have seized the 
initiative is far more complex. With a surfeit of aircraft, as is 
implied by the ability to shift to the offensive, one must carefully 
"manage" the available aircraft assets because of the wider range 
of options for the employment of attack aircraft. 
With Warsaw Pact forces in the offensive, A-10, A-7 and similar 
type aircraft should give an effective account of themselves in CAS 
operations in complex, fluctuating FEBA situations characteristic 
of tank warfare. Based on the German experience against the Soviets 
in 1944, and a credible intuitive sense of the problems of deep thrusts 
by armored forces, one can anticipate a significant degradation of 
Soviet air defences above the most dangerous Warsaw Pact forces leading 
the attempted breakthroughs. The logic is impressive to conduct air 
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antitank warfare where (1) the danger is greatest, and (2) air defenses 
are severely dislocated. The logic also involves making a virtue out 
of the necessities of the opening phases of a Warsaw Pact offensive, 
i.e., friendly attack aircraft will be restricted to CAS because of 
the imposing difficulties of interdicting a carefully prepared 
offensive by high quality, numerically superior forces. 
As the general Central European scenario shifts toward the NATO 
seizure of the initiative, numerous locations in enemy held territory 
open up as options for fixed-wing air attack against tanks. The vast 
zone of communications for fuel-and-ammunition-heavy armored forces 
becomes more readily available for attack with the erosion of the 
enemy tactical air force and NATO achievement of air superiority. 
NATO tactical aircraft should be able to penetrate Soviet ground 
air defense networks with appropriate weapons, tactics, and near 
the FEBA, cooperation with the artillery and other supporting arms 
of the ground forces. Using the precedents of the 1973 Mid East war, 
ground forces can be used in some cases to disrupt opposing air 
defenses. Tank .targets should become relatively more elusive, but 
opportunities should arise to attack tanks and other armored vehicles 
deep in the zone of communication as they reinforce and redeploy. 
High navigational performance aircraft like the A-7 and F-4 should 
increase in effectiveness relative to CAS aircraft like the A-10. 
Colonel R. Dilger, USAF noted that the A-10 aircraft, however, given 
the reduced air cover over the Warsaw Pact forces, and the multiple 
pass capability of its 1,350-round capacity Gatling gun, probably 
represents a superior multi-hit capability over the more sophisticated 
A-7 and F-4 aircraft. 
The Marine major attending the seminar took the view that there 
were efficiencies and conveniences in keeping enemy tanks as far as 
possible from the FEBA, and fixed-wing aircraft with their range, 
speed, navigational devices, and heavy ordnance loads were particularly 
suited to isolate the battlefield. The view of the major was probably 
influenced by his service's organization under which the Marine Corps 
has maintained its strategic mobility but at the expense of not having 
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a significant tank force. Soviet forces consist almost entirely 
of tank and motorized rifle divisions, with several hundred tanks 
and many hundreds more armored vehicles in each division. A 
Soviet force, or similarly organized one on the opposite side of 
the FEBA from an opposing Marine Corps unit, cannot be isolated 
from its tanks because it will already be a tank force. The idea, 
which the Marine major espoused, of hitting the highest threat, 
i.e., tanks, farthest away in interdiction-style attacks, has 
to be modified by the necessity to conduct CAS strikes against 
Soviet tanks because of the way in which the Soviets equip and 
organize themselves for combat. 
The Naval officers agreed in general with the Marine Corps 
officer's ideas about the desirability of interdicting armored 
forces. The Navy connnander present, stressed the point of 
preventing as many Soviet .tanks as possible from reaching the 
FEBA. He felt that the interdiction style attacks would be made 
against less formidable air defenses, a point which is open to 
question while the Soviets have the initiative and can plan in 
advance for the deployment of their forces. He noted that if 
strikes had to be made on the FEBA, they would probably be 
challenging and have to be extraordinarily well coordinated to 
overcome the anticipated air defense systems. At this point, the 
Marine colonel present, made the parallel observa~ion that given 
the relative independence of units on the modern battlefield that 
command and control factors, indeed, would be crucial, and that 
the coordination of antitank strikes would require effective air 
intelligence and connnand flexibility. 
The Army officers noted that the location for CAS attacks by 
tactical aircraft would be directed largely by the ground connnander 
based on his sense of danger and opportunity. Mr. Gaines (Vought) 
made the point that CAS attacks might be only a small percentage of 
the tactical sorties run in a theater of operations. He felt that 
the battlefield interdiction area (five to 20 miles or more beyond 
the FEBA) offers great opportunity for the defeat of large numbers 
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of different types of targets with area rather than point types of 
air munitions. Mr. Gaines made the significant conunent that in 
World War II "except during special operations only 15 percent of 
the total Tactical Air Forces were needed to meet the Army's require-
ment for CAS. The remaining 85 percent were employed in isolation of 
th~ battlefield ..• ". The point is well taken that CAS may at some 
juncture in campaigns be a small percentage of the total effort. The 
data which Mr. Gaines presented, however, is based on the Allies in 
Western Europe (1944-1945) almost entirely on the offensive against 
a vastly outnumbered enemy in the advanced stages of defeat. The 
general Central European scenario reverses the scene to show the 
NATO forces outnumbered and on the defensive with markedly less 
opportunity to conduct interdiction strikes against a high quality, 
advancing enemy. 
The European experts were asked somewhat different questions in 
order to focus attention on their actual combat experience. The questions 
were: in what locations in the potential battle area did you attack 
tanks in 1943-1945? and, what factors drove you to choose certain 
areas for attack to the exclusion of others? Colonel Rudel remarked 
in his intense and decisive manner that "aircraft should be used against 
tanks which have broken through". He specifically noted that "to 
attack tanks in their assembly positions was suicide". This latter 
point is particularly instructive because the sense of the seminar 
attendees was that a less effective air defense network could be 
expected in second echelon areas. Rudel elaborated on his remark 
by describing his first sorties in the twin-cannon, Gustav Stukas 
near Krumpskaya, late in 1943, in the bridgehead area of the German 
17th Army in the Kuban region of the Caucasus. He stated that the 
tanks, which his unit attacked in assembly areas well behind the FEBA, 
were so well protected by antiaircraft guns that the Stukas were unable 
to get through to the tanks. Rudel achieved no kills and it was a 
frustrating way to begin his antitank career. In contrast, he noted 
his general success in attacking Soviet tanks in penetrations where 
the towed and self-propelled antiaircraft weapons had thinned out. 
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Particularly easy tanks to kill, he stated, were the ones which 
had become separated slightly from the rest of the tanks and the 
antiaircraft guns. 
General Hozzel, who had achieved great success with the bomb-
armed, Dora Stukas in the Soviet zone of communications near Kalach 
in the Eastern Ukraine in September 1942, stated that attacks against 
Soviet tanks after that period were made "only against Soviet tanks 
which had broken through". The major exception to his statement 
would be the German air operations within the great, relatively fluid 
battle around Kursk in July 1943. At Kursk, the Germans achieved 
substantial success well behind Soviet lines with 30mm gun Henschel-
129 aircraft against Soviet tanks defending themselves in the opening 
stages of the German offensive north and south of that city. After 
July 1943, the German air antitank effort was conducted almost 
exclusively by "cannon-birds" against attacking Soviet tanks in 
breakthrough situations. Hozzel mentioned that during both the earlier 
bomb and later gun phases of German air antitank operations that 
the self-propelled and towed antiaircraft guns which accompanied the 
Soviet tanks demanded special attention. He stated that "special 
flights were detailed to go for the antiaircraft Panzers", and that 
the Germans detailed the flak suppressors to attack any armored vehicle 
which was firing into the air. Rudel substantiated Hozzel's view 
of tactics by noting that he similarly flew with mixes of flak suppression 
and antitank aircraft against enemy tanks in the breakthrough. 
Topic V was concerned with the combat area where fixed-wing aircraft 
would be especially effective against armored vehicles, and proved 
to be subject to a variety of approaches and answers. Some light crept 
through the clouds of discussion, nevertheless, because it became 
apparent that the general situation in the theater of operations imposed 
general areas for air antitank operations. The combat areas for air 
antitank operations ran as follows 
Theater Situation 
1. Warsaw Pact Central 
Offensive. 





Air Antitank NATO Combat Areas 
CAS versus Warsaw Pact Breakthrough 
Armor Near FEBA. 
CAS versus Warsaw Pact Armor For.ces Near FEBA. 
Interdiction versus Warsaw Pact Forces and 
Material in Zone of Communications. 
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Although little concensus was achieved among the attendees on 
the areas in which air antitank operations should be conducted, it 
became apparent that CAS-type operations near rapidly flucuating 
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THE SEMINAR: TOPIC VI 
Topic VI supplements the previous one in the sense that 
it also addresses the problem of tactics for fixed-wing antitank 
aircraft. The topic presents the air defense challenge to antitank 
aircra~t in terms of the question: what tactics of employment for 
fixed-wing antitank aircraft offer the most effective means of 
overcoming potential enemy air defense systems? Colonel Romack, 
USAF, opened discussion of the question for both the seminar and 
the Air Force attendees with the cogent point that high technology 
air defense systems "should be avoided rather than subdued". He 
noted the effectiveness of Soviet electronics and emphasized the 
importance of standoff jamming. The Colonel feels that the Air 
Force must buy enough "confusion time" with its electronics warfare 
aircraft to allow the antitank machines to get in among the armored 
vehicles. The question which arises is whether or not the Wild 
Weasel (electronics countermeasures) aircraft can operate effectively 
with aircraft like the A-10. The Air Force has begun to embrace 
low level attacks as one of the more important tactics for A-10 
employment. Depending upon the radicalness of the tactics employed, 
the A-10 squadrons may have to provide their own flak suppression by 
attacking with mixes of A-10 antitank and combined electronics 
countermeasures and flak-suppression aircraft. 
The air defense threat from Warsaw Pact forces is an imposing 
one which can be arranged roughly as follows: 
Warsaw Pact Tactical 
Air Defense Blocks 
1. The Missiles 
2. The Guns 




SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, SA-9, SA-7 
ZSU-57/2, 57 S-60, ZSU-23/4, 
ZU-23/2, 14.5 ZPU-4 
7.62 RPK, PK, AKM, 9mm Pistol1 
The threat, in terms of numerous and varied air defense weapons, 
which accompany the ground forces, is impressive. Captain C. Harr, 
USAF, an experienced A-10 pilot warned, under the circumstances, 
lcolonel Rudel observed on several occasions on the Eastern Front in 1944-
1945, Soviet troops lying on their backs firing at his aircraft with pistols. 
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against total dependence on the F-111 and EA6B electronics counter-
measures aircraft. He felt that the A-10 aircraft should have the 
capability itself to deceive or jam the threat fire control and 
acquisition devices. Captain J. Jumper, USAF, noted that potential 
antitank aircraft like the A-10 and also the F-4 are big and easy 
to acquire with radar. He emphasized that electronics counter-
measures must be used to gain time for the attack by antitank aircraft. 
At this point Colonel R. Dilger, USAF, introduced a series of 
wise, practical, and realistic comnents. He noted that Soviet tank 
and motorized rifle divisions were "very lethal in static positions 
where air defenses can be carefully sited in a compact area". With 
a note of realistic optimism, he stated that in Central Europe at 
the beginning of a Warsaw Pact offensive the Soviet division would 
be on the move with extensive dislocation of its air defenses, especially 
after contact with NATO ground forces. The point is particularly 
well taken because division movement will result in myriad problems 
of mechanical breakdown, terrain hazards to movement, fuel and 
ammunition resupply, e.g., the ZSU-23/4 has fewer than 30 seconds 
of firing time for each load of ammunition, etc. Colonel Dilger went 
on to enumerate four other factors in the air defense picture: 
(1) With targets under 300 feet, the air defense missiles 
rapidly lose their effectiveness. 
(2) Missiles with infrared sensors can be beaten by flares. 
(3) The built-in armament in the A-10 aircraft is a potent 
flak suppressor. 
(4) The real threat to antitank aircraft in many realistic 
attack profiles may be small arms fire from motorized rifle troops. 
Air Staff officers at the seminar brought out the value of area, 
low altitude munitions in support of any aircraft which are attacking 
point targets but particularly antitank aircraft. The area munitions 
could effectively damage any of the Soviet air defense weapons including 
the thinly armored but effectively covered SU-57/2 and especially the 
ZSU-23/4 weapons. The SA-6, SA-8, and SA-9 missile vehicles are more 
susceptible to damage because of their large externally mounted missiles. 
Area munitions will also suppress small arms fire from troops deployed 
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out of their armored assault vehicles and personnel carriers. Army 
artillery, with its volume of fire, range, and accuracy can place 
area fires many miles behind the FEBA and is a strong candidate for 
purposeful fires against suspected air defense areas. Both Colonel 
Romack, and Colonel R. Sauers, USA, emphasized the extraordinary 
potential of both 105mm and 155mm howitzers and several of the army 
big flatter trajectory guns in the flak-suppression role. Colonel 
Dilger characterized most of the munitions which would be employed 
as des~ribed above, as disruptive, and noted that an effective tactic 
would be the saturation of a tank-heavy area with disruptive munitions 
followed by antitank aircraft acquisition passes and attack against 
tanks. 
The senior Marine Corps attendee discussed the issue of day 
versus night combat against tanks. The leaders of Marine Corps 
aviation, with energy and foresight, have emphasized the 24-hour 
battle. Combat certainly should be carried to the enemy during the 
night, but the technological problems at the present moment of 
acquiring and effectively attacking tanks at night are beyond the 
state of the art for stationary, concealed and/or covered tanks, 
and difficult for moving vehicles even with their various types of 
electromagnetic signatures. The Marine Corps, with its lack of 
effective cannons on its combat aircraft for attacks against armored 
vehicles, should probably give first priority to straightforward 
daylight cannon armament and other daylight weapons, e.g., a cheap, 
effective air-to-surface missile, before emphasizing night attacks 
against tanks. Figures Three, Four, Five, and Six, which compare 
the Marine Corps ADEN and Air Force GAU-u/A cannons, reveal frailties 
in the British gun and suggest the need for improved Marine Corps 
(and Navy) attack aircraft gun systems. 
The Euroexperts addressed themselves to a variation of the Topic 
VI question which ran as follows: what tactics did you use to cope 
with the Soviet air defenses on the ground? Rudel reiterated an 
earlier point that successful tank hunting is not part of a static 
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FIGURE THREE 
BRITISH ADEN versus US GAU-8/A 
TECHNOL'OGICAL COMPARISON 
BRITISH ADEN! 




136.6 in (incl pod) 
912 lbs (2 pods) 
260 rds (2 pods) 
257.9 lbs(2 pods,HEI) 3 2,600 rds/min(2 pods) 
43 rds/sec(2 pods) 
21.9 lbs/sec(2 pods) 
2,500 ft/sec (HEI) 
5 mils dispersion 
US GAU-8/A2 





3, 791 lbs 
1,350 rds 




3,215 ft/sec (APIT) 
5 mils dispersion 
Verbal Analysis: The GAU-8/A cannon is larger and more efficient than the 
ADEN gun. The muzzle horsepower per weight of cannon is more than twice as 
great (see Figure Five), and the GAU-8/A has the gun accuracy and projectile 
lethality at 3,000 ft ranges which give a reasonable probability (>0.33) of 
destroying a Soviet MBT. The present ADEN REI ammunition provides essentially 
no capability to damage the same target at any range. 
1 Hispano-Suiza guns, 2General Electric gun, 3Based on max rate of fire of 










1 .!i£. Vt2 
2 g 
[measured in ft-lbs 
in English system 
and joules in Metric 
systen\I 
Wp = Wt,Projectile 
Vt = Projectile Velo-
city at Target 
g = Acceleration due 
to gravity ft/sec/ 
sec 
joule= 0.7376 ft-lbs 
FIGURE FOUR 
BRITISH ADEN Versus US GAU-8/A 
DESIGN EFFICIENCY: PROJECTILE ENERGY 
BRITISH ADEN 
30mm, Single Barrel 
5-Chamber, Revolver 





Air Speed, 450 knots 
Slant Range, 6,600 ft 
Projectile Energy = 
11,000* ft-lbs 
[energy of each 
projectile as it 
impacts on target 








(in mass production) 
Air Speed, 450 knots 
Slant Range, 6,600 ft 
Projectile Energy = 
100,000 ft-lbs 
~nergy of each 
projectile as it 
impacts on target 
6,600 ft distant] 
Verbal Analysis: The projectile energy of the GAU-8/A APIT projectile 
exceeds that of the ADEN HEDP rounds under development by almost one order 
of magnitude under the conditions noted above. The lesson: the ADEN gun and 
ammunition are frail by comparison with the U.S. weapon. 
*Projectile energy equals 11,000 ft-lbs; shape change provides add!. 
11,000 ft-lbs. 
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FIGURE FIVE 
BRITISH ADEN Versus US GAU-8/A 




Measure in Terms 
of Muzzle Horsepower 
Per Weight of Gun 
2 HP = WpVo R 
gun wt Wg 
Wp=Wt, Projectile 
Vo=Muzzle Velocity 
R =Rate of Fire 6 K =Constant,1.6 (10 ) 
Wg=Wt,Cannon (not 
incl ammo & poF 
BRITISH ADEN 





Per Pound of Cannon 
(0.51) (2575) 2 (43) = 
32 (320 









Per Pound of Cannon 
(0.95) (3215) 2 (66) 
32 (620) 
32,800 HP/lb of 
cannon 
(APIT annno) 
Verbal Analysis: The GAU-8/A cannon dominates the ADEN gun in the Design 
Efficiency comparison above. The GAU-8/A, although considerably heavier than 
the ADEN, compensates in terms of superior rate of fire, muzzle velocity, and 
projectile weight. Additionally, the GAU-8/A projectiles are capable of per-
forating armor more effectively than either the HE! or HEDP ADEN rounds, a 






1. Soviet MBT (T-55) 
Probability of Kill 
(P )1 
k 
2. Soviet APC (BTR-152 
Probability of Kill 
<:k) 
3. Soviet Truck(211-157) 
Probability of Kill 
(Pk) 
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FIGURE SIX 
BRITISH ADEN Versus US GAU-8/A 
TARGET EFFECTS 
BRITISH ADEN 
30nnn, Single Barrel, 
5-Chamber Revolver, 




1 pk = 0.24 
(10° Dive, 1000 ft 
range) 
pk = 0.57 
(10° Dive, 1000 ft 
range) 
Pk= 0.58 (0.79 HE!) 








(in mass production) 
pk = 0.99 
(10° Dive, 1000 ft 
range) 
pk = 0.99 
(10° Dive, 1000 ft 
range) 
pk = 0.95 
(10° Dive, 1000 ft 
range) 
Verbal Analysis: The above figures for the British ADEN are based on the 
latest data available as of June 1977, from NWC., China Lake, Calif. The 
figures for the US GAU-8/A are estimates made by Professor Stolfi on the 
basis of unclassified material available for.Soviet vehicles and the general 
characteristics of the GAU-8/A annnunition. The data show that the new HEDP 
round under development for· the Navy and Marine Corps (ADEN cannon) is not 
going to provide the Marine Corps with satisfactory Pk figures for either 
tanks or APCs. At 10° dive angle and 2800 ft ranges, for example, the Pk 
values for the ADEN HEDP round falls against the T-55 tank to a negligible 
0.04. The attack conditions noted in the figure include the extremely favo-
rable one of firing breaking off at (approximately) 1,000 ft. The range is 
"point blank" for an aircraft and represents roughly the maximum damage 
effects which can be achieved by an aircraft in terms of proximity to the 
target and potential lethal effects of gun-type ammunition. As shown in 
the figure, the ADEN HEDP round is not particularly impressive even under the 
extremely favorable conditions of 1,000 ft slant range. The Pk for tanks and 
APCs becomes ineffective with ranges of about 2,800 ft for the ADEN cannon 
with either HEDP or HEI annnunition. 
1 Rear Quadrant Attack for T-55 tank. 
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maintained the view that when the tanks have become separated from 
the antiaircraft guns during major attacks and deep penetrations is 
the time to employ the tank hunting aircraft. Rudel suggests from 
these statements that the best way to cope with the Soviet air defenses 
on the ground is to avoid them, as successfully as possible, by 
attacking the "packs of tanks" which have become most separated 
from their accompanying air defense weapons. He goes on to state 
in a realistic vein that it was rarely possible to find the tanks 
even in extreme breakthrough situations without some accompanying 
antiaircraft protection. The antiaircraft situation was generally 
difficult even in the mobile situations and he states that "we 
sometimes had only one Gustav with normally several Stuka Ds and Fs 
flying flak suppression with bombing attacks." One group in his 
wing was outfitted with the high performance Focke-Wulf 190 aircraft 
to be used as flak suppression aircraft but "they were not as accurate 
in bombing as the Stukas ... ". 
Rudel mentions consistently that the Soviet air defenses were 
dense and challenging1 and that it was difficult for him to keep his 
pilots alive much beyond 30 tank kills. Losses to opposing aircraft 
in spite of Soviet air superiority were low--approximately 10 percent 
of losses to antitank aircraft. The overwhelming majority of pilots 
were shot down by antiaircraft artillery (45 percent) and small arms 
(45 percent). Rudel went on to make several valuable points about 
the problems of surviving the antiaircraft defenses. First, he noted 
that the inexperienced pilots spent too much time controlling the 
aircraft and not enough time concentrating on target acquisition, 
sensing fire ambushes, and maneuvering effectively into successful 
firing ranges and tank quadrants. Second, he went on to say that it 
was necessary to "see the most effective range to the target", in 
his case 200 meters, and rapidly maneuver into that range for shooting. 
Third, Rudel emphasized that most of the pilots who died were killed 
while spending a fatal extra second or seconds in the final straight 
Many current "experts 11 tend to disregard the very heavy and concentrated 
AAA environment of the Eastern Front in WW II when they consider the current 
air defensive systems of the Warsaw Pact. One cannot make the statement that 
the air defense environment of today is more of a threat than the USSR environ-
ment in 1943-1944 relative to the respective weapons systems involved. 
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firing run on a tank. He mentions that when he "saw" the familiar, 
correct range he "straightened out momentarily" (approximately ~ 
second) and fired the two synchronized rounds which generally gave 
him a catastrophic kill on the tank. 
General Hozzel stated that in the tank attacks by the Immelmann 
Wing in late 1942, that special flights of Stukas were designated to 
go for the air defense vehicles and towed weapons. He mentioned that 
he would "get an idea of how strong the antiaircraft defenses and 
make t~e final decision of whether or not to launch the antitank 
attack". First priority, though, was to expose and attack the air 
defenses. Rudel gave one particularly interesting insight into the 
difficulty of the air defenses mastering a determined pilot. He 
recalls the time late in the war when he was hit badly in the right 
leg and notes with deep chagrin that it was a foolish situation which 
could easily have been avoided. Returning several times to attack a 
tank which would not burn or explode under the impacts of his projectiles, 
he was buffeted from the blast and fragments of what he describes as 
40mm flak. He states clearly that once the 40mm projectiles were 
getting close enough to damage his aircraft, it was an ominous warning 
that he had only a short time to survive. Rudel, nevertheless, 
continued for brief additional moments to observe the kill and lost 
his right leg as the flak smashed into his aircraft and brought him 
down for approximately the 36th t_ime in his career and on this occasion 
close to death. All of his instincts and experience warned him to leave 
before the disastrous moment; all he had to do was obey them. 
In summarization, one can say that comments ran in a familiar pattern 
of direct addressal to the question by the Air Force and Army attendees, 
and oblique but constructive intellectual movements around the edges of 
the question by the Marine Corps and Naval attendees. The comments of 
the Euroexperts were unique in several ways and serve, even after the 
passage of more than 30 years, to illuminate several principles which 
remain valid because they are part of the unchanged nature of war. 
The range of views is presented in the following verbal matrix: 
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Attendees Mastering the 
Air Defense Challenge 
·- _._ ____ - ·-· --===:=:: ___ -_   
1. USAF, USA - - - - - - - - - - Air Antitank Low Level Atk by Mixes 
of AT and Flak Suppression Aircraft. 
Attack Tanks Near FEBA in Mobile Ground 
2. USMC, USN - -
3. Euroexperts 
Situations as Necessitated Largely by 
Enemy Breakthrough. 
Emphasize Possibilities of Night Atk 
& Sophisticated EC Aircraft 
- Air Antitank Atk by Mixes of AT and 
Flak Suppression Aircraft Near FEBA 
as Necessitated by Enemy Breakthrough. 
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SEMINAR: TOPIC VII 
Topic VII was concerned with the tactics of acquiring tanks as 
targets and attacking them with fixed-wing antitank aircraft. The 
question addressed to the seminar attendees took the form: what tactics 
and weapons are most effective in acquiring enemy tanks from the air 
and subsequently destroying them? Air Staff attendees noted the importance 
of developing a series of tactical training scenarios for working out air 
antitank tactics. They felt that the scenarios should be based on the 
ground commanders' schemes of maneuver, which they noted with trepidation 
would be "in reverse" during the Warsaw Pact initial offensive. The 
senior Air Force attendee from Wright Patterson, AFB, Ohio, noted the 
generally accepted "enormous enemy ground attack". He asked the question: 
what do we know about their intentions? and answered it by noting the 
great Warsaw Pact surge which the West can anticipate will take place 
with the goal to reach the North Sea and English Channel. Colonel 
Dilger then noted that the ground combat environment would probably 
be target rich, an assumption of great importance in addressing the 
question of target acquisition and attack. He stated that the CAS 
aircraft of the U.S. tactical air forces in Europe should be prepared 
to fly 2,000 sorties the first day against the tanks and lighter 
armored vehicles of the Soviet division with possibly ten passes during 
each sortie. The Colonel did not go into the details of target 
acquisition and attack, but he implied in his analysis that tanks will 
be numerous and exposed, and the air defenses degraded during the offensive 
thrusts of the mobile divisions. 
Major E. Bigham, USAF, attending from Air Staff, noted that target 
acquisition, including positive enemy identification and marking, would 
be major problems and ones which are not presently sorted out for a tank 
war. He continued by noting that Israeli CAS broke down in the 1973 War 
in the Mid East and there could be some lessons which might be applied 
to the Central European scenario. The application would have to be 
handled with care, through, because of the cautious Egyptian strategy and 




rather limited general movement. Captain Jumper, USAF, Nellis AFB, 
made the point which ties in with the examination of "lessons" from 
the 1967 and 1973 Mid East wars, that fairly predictable arrays of 
vehicles can be expected in first echelon situations. The Egyptian 
and Syrian armored forces which had been set up and heavily tutored 
by Soviet military missions attacked using tactical arrays and 
dispositions of equipment closely in accord with what the West has 
anticipated would be the case in Central Europe. The great difference 
appears in the strategical concepts where the Soviet forces are 
expected to expand their tactical moves into deep strategical 
penetrations westward to the Atlantic coasts. The predictable arrays 
of vehicles allow the development, however, as Captain Jumper 
intimated, of specific techniques for acquisition and tactics for 
attack against the Soviet armored vehicles. 
The Marine Corps and Navy attendees emphasized the necessity 
of coordinating attacks against tanks with forward air controllers 
(FACs). Under some circumstances, ground FACs will acquire targets 
and aid the antitank aircraft in acquiring the same targets. Techniques 
of acquiring tanks independently from the air, for example, by airborne 
FAC or antitank aircraft will be heavily influenced by the air defense 
environment. Commander L. Kaufman, USN, NWC, China Lake, feels that in 
daylight, low altitude ingress to enemy country and a two-man crew could 
be particularly effective in antitank sorties against heavy air defenses. 
The Marine Corps and Navy attendees both agreed that night attacks offer 
possibilities for successful attacks against tanks. The present possibil-
ities for night attack would seem to be severely limited given current 
target acquisition hardware, fire control devices, and weapons, but should 
not prevent aggressive attention to the opportunities and advantages of 
fighting the 24-hour battle. 
The Army officers emphasized the combined arms nature of the 
potential battle and the assistance the ground forces can give in 
acquiring and marking targets. Ground forces artillery can be particul-






ground forces tank crews and mechanized infantry will often be acquired 
in reverse by enemy tank and motorized infantry forces. The Army will 
often have a surfeit of lucrative targets for air antitank strikes. 
The Air Force FACs with the Army battalions form the link between the 
engaged ground forces units and the air antitank flights. Acquisition 
problems for the aircraft are s·everely reduced under these conditions, 
but if the ground units are badly mauled and the FACs out of action, 
the acquisition problems rise again as the aircraft are forced into 
an open hunt for the tanks and mechanized infantry combat vehicles. 
The Euroexperts were asked specific questions of the nature: 
what methods did you use to locate and identify Soviet tanks? and, 
what is the most important factor in being able to discover concealed 
tanks? Rudel stated that combined liaison and air controllers, who 
were actual Luftwaffe officers, were located as far forward as the 
divisions of the German Army. There was only one Luftwaffe officer, 
called a Flievo, with each division, but apparently he proved to be 
especially effective, and as a matter of doctrine, was located with 
the lead elements of the main attack forces of the division on the 
offensive. In hunting tanks in general areas designated by aerial 
intelligence or air and ground reports of sightings, Rudel flew at 
about 800 meters, which he felt was an effective height from which 
to establish eye contact. "When the tanks were finally discovered, 
there was always flak", Rudel noted, and the flak suppressors would 
go in, followed by the antitank aircraft. In the numerous small 
Russian villages, the Soviets normally would park their tanks inside 
of the farm houses and small city buildings and the vehicles were 
extremely difficult to lacate. Rudel mentioned that most often he 
was able to detect the tanks in the houses because of the Soviet 
mania for having the gun barrels protrude, based probably on a 
sense of the combat usefulness of being able to fire in at least 
a limited arc. Once discovered, the Soviet tanks were attacked by 
bomb-carrying Stukas which blew away the houses and exposed the T-34s 
to final assault by the "cannon-birds". 
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Rudel went on to elaborate that locating tanks was an extra-
ordinarily challenging task. It took his full attention, required 
him to fly the aircraft as an automatic function with no "conscious" 
attention to the details of controlling the aircraft and full attention 
to the visual hunt for the enemy tanks. He felt that a backup man -
additional crew member - was vital in order to maintain the pilot's 
concentration on the search and other details like the detection of 
fire ambushes. Both Rudel and General Hozzel made the observation 
that the most common way of locating tanks in agricultural areas and 
forests was to look for and follow the tracks to the places of 
concealment. Especially in wet or soft ground, tanks leave track 
signatures which are virtually impossible to eliminate. 
The Soviet tanks which were most commonly attacked by the German 
air antitank pilots were the successful T-34 tanks, models B, C, and 
the early 1944 vehicle designated T-34 (85). These Soviet tanks 
were particularly well armored and possessed roughly the same degree 
of survivability as the present Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks. Even 
with their effective 37mm aircraft cannons, the Germans were forced 
to attack the Soviet tanks from above the rear quadrant in order to 
achieve perforation through the plates, covers, mesh, etc. over the 
engine compartment and the relatively thin plates over the fighting 
compartment and on top of the turret. The armor on the sides of the 
hulls of the Soviet tanks was thinner than at the front, and susceptible, 
especially below the tracks, to perforation given reasonable angles of 
obliquity for the impacting projectiles. Rudel preferred, and 
maneuvered religiously for shots from the rear quadrant, aiming 
specifically for the top of the engine compartment just behind the 
turret. In cases where the T-34 tanks would not burn after they had 
been hit in the engine compartment, Rudel, if the air defense situation 
allowed, would a~tack from the side hoping to get perforations through 
the fighting compartment and into stowed ammunition. Actually, many 
of Rudel's catastrophic kills probably resulted from perforations 
through the rear or even sides of the turret, e.g., turret at roughly 
9 or 3 o'clock positions, and into stowed ammunition in the fighting 
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compartment. The specially modified guns and ammunition, which Rudel 
used late in the war, had the astounding penetration of close to 
70mm of homogeneous, rolled armored (with some face hardening) at 
his short engagement ranges. 
In Topic VII, the comments of the U.S. armed forces attendees 
were of some interest on the subject of acquisition of tank targets, 
particularly those on tank-rich environments and predictable arrays 
of first echelon Soviet armored vehicle targets. Virtually no 
comments'were made on the subject of actual attack on the tank 
probably because time was growing short in the seminar, the activity 
had been intense during the preceding hours, and a certain amount 
of dislocation had occured with latecomers to the conference who 
were not fully aware of the rules of engagement. The Euroexperts, 
however, partly compensated for the dearth of connnents with their 
detailed descriptions of actual gun attacks against tanks. 
In summary, the last topic addressed by the seminar resulted 
in accord and virtually concensus on the point that target acquisition 
in air antitank attacks would present difficult and possibly unique 
problems. Attendees generally agreed that low level acquisition of 
tanks and follow-up low level attacks were credible daylight tactics, 
but presented potentially unique situations for air attack. The attendees 
were in agreement that command and control would be particularly important, 
and that the Army and Marine Corps FACs at battalion level would provide 
acquisition information which might reduce the acquisition problem 
below the levels suggested by the German experience on the Eastern Front. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Air Antitank Seminar at the Naval Postgraduate School brought 
together attendees from the U.S. Armed Forces and industry to discuss 
air antitank warfare. The "discussion" was uniquely structured to 
allow the attendees, who represented a wide cross-section of opinion, 
to present their views on a set of air antitank topics. The unique 
structuring took the form of having each group of attendees present 
its views through one or several spokesmen. Instead of becoming a 
. 
relatively chaotic conversation among a large number of people on 
common topics, the seminar proceded as a series of presentations by 
group spokesmen. 
The Europeans, General Hozzel, General Mahlke, and Colonel Rudel, 
were introduced in absentia near the end of each SO-minute series of 
presentations. They had been interviewed in Europe prior to the seminar 
on a parallel set of air antitank topics. The answers to the questions 
which they were asked on the parallel topics were presented by Professor 
Stolfl and his thesis student at the Naval Postgraduate School, Captain 
Ratley. The Europeans were men with major experience of antitank warfare 
and their views were used to tie together each topic in terms of the 
actual results of recent history. 
The following topics, each in a SO-minute block and in the sequence 
* as noted were addressed in the seminar: 
FW Aircraft Air Weapons Tactics: Where Tactics: How to 
General US Assets to attack Attack Tanks 
~ Airclaft A? Pil~t Ta~tics: low AT ~lot 
US Assets Selection to Master AD Training 
*FW= Fixed-wing, AD= Air defense. 
The seminar organizers, with pronounced streaks of optimism and 
Platonism, felt that consensus, or simple, clear lack of consensus, 
could be obtained on the topics. The organizers felt that air attack 
against tanks in a Central European style, tank heavy scenario, i.e., 
friendly forces initially on the defensive, lent itself to easily 
graded selections of aircraft, weapons, pilot selection, tactics, 
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and training. On the first topic, the attendees arrived at a 
substantial consensus to the effect that fixed-wing aircraft 
provided unique advantages in attack against tanks, which 
should be exploited by the Free World. On the remaining topics": 
specific aircraft, weapons, pilot selection, tactics, and training, 
the attendees failed to achieve consensus with the most consistent 
differences arising between the Air Force and Naval Service (USMC and USN). 
Th~ seminar organizers felt that the second topic with its succinct 
and manageable question, which called for an antitank rating of present 
aircraft in the service inventories, would result in useful listings 
of combat and other aircraft. The Air Force officers placed the A-10 
and A-7 aircraft at the top of their list emphasizing the low-speed 
agility, built-in cannon, and impact survivability of the former in 
the front line, CAS role while pointing out the potential effectiveness 
of the A-7 aircraft in antitank attack in the interdiction role. 
Mr. Gaines (Vought), whose industrial organization builds the A-7 
aircraft, emphasized with restraint and accuracy the potential 
effectiveness of that weapon system against tanks. The Marine Corps 
and Navy officers skirted the question emphasizing the usefulness of 
sophisticated all-weather aircraft like the A6E3 in night attacks on 
tanks but not prioritizing all the naval service aircraft available 
for antitank attack in terms of their general characteristics. The 
European experts emphasized the use of a robust, maneuverable, stable 
platform for direct attack against individual tanks. 
The seminar discussion on aircraft supports several conclusion-like 
statements. A well informed group of participants agreed in direct 
statements and various oblique arguments that the A-10 aircraft with its 
designed emphasis on close air support and its unique built-in antitank 
cannon system has a clear edge over any other aircraft in the U.S. 
inventory for daylight attacks against Soviet tanks in the strategical 
11 d C 1 E 11 • II defensive part of the genera y accepte entra uropean scenario • 
The participants concluded that other aircraft, for example, the faster 
and more sophisticated A-7 aircraft would be effective when opportunity 
arose for interdiction strikes in the NATO counteroffensive part of the 




magazine and range-demonstrated capability to damage Soviet main battle 
tanks gives the A-10 aircraft a flexible and accurate multi-pass capa-
bility against tanks in daylight which cannot be matched by any aircraft 
in the US inventory. The GAU-8/A cannon along with several other attri-
butes of the aircraft gives the combined weapon system its superiority 
in antitank attack in the CAS role and parity in effectiveness with 
faster and more sophisticated aircraft in the interdiction role. Other 
aircraft, for example, the A-4, A-6, A-7, and F-4, are strong candidates 
for being effective antitank aircraft except for the less credible mix 
of munitions available to them for damaging tanks. 
The third topic and its associated question called for an antitank 
rating of present weapons which are available to US combat and other 
military aircraft. The attendees courageously and somewhat more coope-
ratively than in the case of aircraft discussed the subject and presented 
their prioritized lists of weapons. From the lists and discussion support-
ing them, one can conclude that diverse and well informed opinion supports 
certain types of guns, guided missiles, and cluster bombs for antitank 
attack. In terms of lethality (perforation and internal effects,) flex-
ibility (low visibility and multiple pass capabilities,) accuracy, and 
reliability, the recently developed US GAU-8/A Gatling gun is probably 
the most effective air antitank weapon. The British 30mm and US 20nnn 
cannons on contemporary US Marine Corps and Naval fixed-wing aircraft 
are ineffective against main battle tanks reducing the effectiveness 
of naval service aviation as a counterbalancing force (in support of 
USground operations) against large potential enemy armored forces. 
Guided missiles like the Air Force Maverick weapon, and cluster bombs 
like the service-wide Rockeye weapon, provide substantial capabilities 
against main battle tanks; but, the performance of both types of weapons 
is reduced markedly in low altitude operations necessitated by common 
weather, battlefield terrain, and air defense situations experienced in 
Central Europe. 
The fourth topic addressed the subject area of pilots and their 
selection for antitank attack. The attendees were asked to consider 
whether or not conditions exist in air antitank warfare which are unique 
enough to necessitate the special selection of pilots engaged largely 
in antitank warfare. If the attendees determined that special selection 
of pilots were desirable, they were asked to define the characteristics 
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which should be sought out in the selection. No concensus was achieved 
in the topic, but the following points stood out sharply. With two 
notable exceptions, the A-10 experimental pilots at Nellis AFB and 
Colonel Rudel, most of the attendees took the view that tanks were just 
another target but then proceeded into discussion which supported a 
view that antitank warfare, in fact, was special. 
The Air Force attendees with the exception as noted, stated that 
if a pilot could attack any ground targets he could attack tanks. The 
Marine Corps and Navy attendees emphasized even more emphatically that 
tanks were just another ground target. But the Air Force recently 
spent hundreds of millions of dollars developing a unique aircraft for 
the special conditions of CAS and., in particular, Central European CAS. 
And Marine Corps aviation stands as a monument to the view held by Ma-
rine Corps leaders that CAS demands special organization, pilots, and 
methods of command and control. 
The conclusion, which is derived obliquely from the discussion of 
Topic IV and other topics, is that CAS is special enough to warrant the 
development of an Air Force A-10-type aircraft and the continued existence 
of Marine Corps aviation. The conclusion about air antitank warfare is 
that is has been considered special enough by the Air Force to warrant 
the development and series production of the GAU-8/A cannon and annnu-
nition. Whether or not the A-10 aircraft, Marine Corps Aviation, and 
attacks with the GAU-8/A cannon necessitate the special selection of 
pilots within an assumed set of special circumstances (scenario) which 
involves air attack against opposing tank and motorized infantry forces, 
remained an unanswered question. 
The A-10 experimental pilots at Nellis AFB, concluded that air 
attack against tanks in a dense air defense envelope with realistic tac-
tics was uniquely challenging. Colonel Rudel concluded that successful 
air attack against tanks demands, to a significantly greater degree than 
ordinary ground attack, special pilots. Rudel stated unequivocably that 
the antitank pilot must be a combat soldier first and foremost even at the 
expense of (small) reductions in his flying abilities. The conclusion, 
which is an authoritative one, must be handled with care. Rudel also em-
phasized, for example, that the antitank pilot, especially in acquiring 
targets, must fly his aircraft with skill bordering an automatic instinct. 
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In final translation, it can be concluded that over and above flying 
ability, aircraft, and weapons, lies the spirit of the antitank pilot, 
which Rudel believes is that of a combat soldier. 
Topics V, VI, and VII were tactical ones which concerned themselves 
with the questions of V, where to attack enemy tanks, VI, how to overcome 
expected air defenses, and VII, how to acquire and knock out individual 
tanks or discrete groups of them. It became apparent that tanks could 
be attacked over broad areas of any theater of war including factories 
deep in the interior of a large country, the communications system linking 
factories and frontal areas, and the zones of combat. Within the broad 
areas noted, the strategical situation determines the specific loca-
tions which tanks can be attacked. The NATO forces will scarcely be 
able to attack Soviet factories or inderdict Soviet and East European 
communications in the opening phases of a Warsaw Pact offensive. Like 
the German forces of 1943-1945 on the Eastern Front, the NATO forces will 
be compelled to react to the initiatives of a numerically superior enemy. 
NATO fighter aircraft of the tactical air forces will be struggling to 
survive and/or achieve air superiority. Attack aircraft will be constrained 
by necessity largely to provide CAS to NATO ground forces which are attempt-
ing to contain attacking enemy armor along fluctuating, discontinuous for-
ward edges of a mobile battle area. Opportunities for interdiction of 
attacking enemy armor will be severely limited by prepared air defense 
networks, numerically superior enemy fighter forces, active and passive 
measures of air defense by Warsaw Pact ground forces in second and rear 
echelon areas, and the dislocations to NATO attack aircraft entailed by 
the advance of enemy armored units. 
The German experience of 1943-1945, and the similar potential NATO 
combat situation in Central Europe, support a view that Warsaw Pact air 
defenses will be most susceptible to penetration and destruction in the 
highly fragmented breakthrough areas along the lines of major effort of 
the attacking armored forces. NATO tactical air units can make a virtue 
out of necessity. The fixed-wing attack aircraft in a ground break-
through situation are able to attack out of friendly territory, close 
to friendly lines, against enemy ground forces dislocated and thinned out 
by the success of their own movements. Low altitude attacks, or low 




equipment, and friendly artillery are factors which support optimism in 
the chances of overwhelming opposing air defense networks near the FEBA. 
The attendees concluded that daylight acquisition of armored targets 
would depend largely on eye contact between pilot (or crew members) and 
tanks. In cases of low visibility and passive defense against air attack, 
pilots will be forced into low altitude, low speed searches to locate tanks 
and distinguish between enemy and friendly vehicles. Once within the 
situation of maintaining eye contact with verified enemy tanks and operat-
ing at effective altitudes within a partly sub~ued enemy air defense system, 
the pilot is constrained in antitank attack by the weight and type of attack 
ordnance, visibility, and terrain. Under conditions of low visibility, 
difficult terrain, and partly subdued air defenses, automatic cannon attacks 
at low altitude offer the highest probability of kill and highest multi-
pass capability. Under conditions of excellent visibility, open flat terrain, 
and partly subdued air defenses, automatic cannon, guided missiles, clusters, 
and laser guided bombs all offer high probabilities of impact and kill. 
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For Coordination, Questions, and Corrunents 
on These Proceedings, Contact: 
Associate Professor Russel H.S. Stolfi 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93940 
Phone: Autovon 878-2981, 2521 
Commercial (408) 646-2981 
and 
ASD/YXA (Attention: Capt. Lonnie 0. Ratley, III, USAF) 
Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 45433 
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